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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EMILIO ROSADO, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
vs. : 
Case NO. 930714-CA 
UNITED STATES ELEVATOR CORP., : 
a California Corporation, : Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Respondent• : 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL ELEMENTS OF THE THREE-PART TEST FOR THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF A RULE 56(f) MOTION MUST BE CONSIDERED 
TOGETHER. EVEN IF ROSADO HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO CONDUCT 
DISCOVERY, THE OTHER TWO ELEMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED 
U.S. Elevator repeatedly asserts that Rosado had sufficient 
time to conduct discovery before the Motion for Summary Judgment 
was filed. Even accepting that proposition, however, U.S. Elevator 
fails to recognize that all three elements of the test found in 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah App. 1990), 
should be satisfied before a court can properly deny a Rule 56(f) 
Motion for Continuance. 
The first element of that test inquires whether the Motion to 
Continue is interposed merely to justify a "fishing expedition" for 
purely speculative facts after substantial discovery has been 
conducted. Rosado's discovery requests, attached to his original 
Brief, were not merely a "fishing expedition" for extraneous, 
irrelevant information. The discovery requests were focused on the 
cent whether U.S. Elevator had properly 
maintained and adjusted the elevator doors which closed on Rosadc i's 
hand. The interrogatories and document requests were directly tui 
speculati ve" '.'• 
irrelevant issues. Further, they were not propounded "after" 
substantial discovery had already been conducted, 
ci Tt: d i ii 1 y noil HI IMSI when. 1 tin-1 "ll'i i a I ("unit iuhl i 01 
significant discovery had already been done and that additional 
discovery would be unlikely yield material issues 
City inquires whether the nonmoving party was afforded appropriate 
responses to his discovery requests As Rosado pointed 
open (j; ]:::: 1 0 ai i ::i 11 1 ) , I I S suppl. 
portior the documents Rosado had requested prior 1 t ne Summary 
Judgment Hearing. These documents were supplied five days before 
the Summary Judgment Hearing. Two of those days t weekend. 
Further, when the documents were provided, the undersigned was in 
the process of preparing for a four day jury trial scheduled to 
start on the morning ^ *-b*> Summary Judgment Hearing. It was 
virtually impossible for undersigned to analyze the documents, 
send them expert appropriate affidavit from 
the expert incorporating . . analysis of documents in the time 
remaining before the Summary Judgment Hearing. Even with those 
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Judgment Hearing, tried to refer to the documents with little 
success. It was clear that the Trial Court was not interested in 
hearing about the evidentiary implications raised in the documents 
U.S. Elevator had supplied. 
U.S. Elevator did not respond to any of the numerous 
interrogatories Rosado had propounded. For U.S. Elevator to claim 
that this was a "sufficient" response to Rosado's discovery is 
absurd• 
A fair reading of Sandy City and the other cases articulating 
the three-part test for determining the sufficiency of a Rule 56(f) 
Motion indicates that all three elements must be considered 
together. 
U.S. Elevator cites three cases for the proposition that 
Rosado had ample time to conduct discovery: Sandy City v. Salt 
Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1990); Callioux v. Progressive 
Ins. Co. . 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987); Reeves v. Geiav 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. , 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988). Each case is 
distinguishable. 
Sandy City is easily distinguishable because Sandy City's 
Motion for a Continuance was denied only after substantial 
discovery had been completed. Sandy City did not allege in its 
Rule 56(f) Affidavit that it needed more time for discovery. Id. 
at 489-490. Rosado did. Moreover, the Court concluded that the 
information Sandy City might have attempted to undercover pursuant 
to additional discovery would have been inappropriate for the 
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Couri consideration i i i any event: _ of the "fact" issues 
,i gl it to discover were outside appropriate 
scope of inquiry 'he central issue in Sandy City 
municipality's challenge to the issuance of a conditional use 
'. The Court held: 
Many of these issues [which may have been 
developed with further discovery] are actually 
issues of law. The only issues of fact are 
the projected cost of the project and whether 
the proposed development was in compliance 
with the county master plan and the county 
ordinances. As we have noted above, these 
issues were discussed and evidence was 
presented before the county commissions, which 
entered written findings and decided them on 
their merits. Because their findings were 
supported by evidence, we do not disturb them 
on review 
I d at 49 C) Sai idy City does not support U.S. Elevator's position. 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co. , is c:l is I, i ngu ,i shall Jl e 1.100:1111:1 e., 
although the Court did grant Summary Judgment while scheduled 
depo pending moving party's Motion for Summary 
Judgment - . filed until two years after the t'ompLdinl w-fis 
Furthermore, the central issue Callioux was the alleged 
a ^j[aim resulting 
froir Callioux's automobile, insurance company 
suspected arson, nvestigation eventually led to a criminal 
s attorney ii 1 the civil 
action against Progressive had defended l-m. at the crimina"1 +-T-I*I. 
ipparent that the attorney had been given ample opportunity 
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Summary Judgment. Further, Callioux failed to make his Rule 56(f) 
Motion for Continuance properly. He delayed filing his Motion for 
Continuance until 4:57 p.m. the Friday afternoon before the Monday 
hearing on the Summary Judgment Motion. Id. at 841. 
Reeves v. Geiay Pharmaceutical. Inc., Supra. is also 
distinguishable. Reeves filed a product liability/medical 
malpractice action in February, 1984. Reeves propounded, and 
received answers to, written discovery requests. The parties took 
several critical depositions within eleven months of the filing of 
the Complaint. Reeves propounded additional written discovery 
requests a year after the Complaint was filed. In April 1986, over 
two years after the Complaint was filed, the defendants filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court upheld the Trial Court's 
denial of Reeve's Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue. Reeves is 
distinguishable because the nonmoving party in that case had had 
over two years to perform discovery and had, in fact, received 
appropriate answers to two sets of written discovery requests. The 
nonmoving party had been able to take critical depositions. 
Further, counsel for the nonmoving party did not "articulate what 
type of additional discovery was needed or the time necessary to 
complete it" in support of her Rule 56(f) request. Id. at 639. 
The Court should recall, as it considers the interplay of the 
three factors mentioned in Sandy City, the salient principle which 
it has repeatedly articulated in its holdings on Rule 56(f) 
Motions. Such motions to continue should be liberally granted: 
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It is generally held the Rule 56(f) motions 
should be granted liberally to provide 
adequate opportunity for discovery, because 
information gained during discovery may create 
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment. 
Sandv Citv v. Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d at 488 (citations 
omitted). It is the exceptional case, where a lack of diligence is 
acutely apparent on the part of the non-moving party and it is 
unlikely that a request for additional discovery will be fruitful, 
in which a 56(f) Motion should be denied. 
Several cases support Rosado's claim that the Lower Court's 
denial of his Rule 56(f) Motion was improper. 
In Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984), the defendant in 
a fraud claim moved for Summary Judgment within a few weeks of the 
filing of plaintiffs1 Complaint. The Lower Court granted the 
motion even though the moving party had never responded to the 
nonmoving party's written discovery requests. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that it was improper to deny the Rule 56(f) 
Motion while discovery was pending. See also Strand v. Associated 
Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977) 
(reversing a Summary Judgment because the nonmoving party had been 
given insufficient opportunity to rebut affidavits is support of 
the motion). 
Several cases from other jurisdictions offer useful guidance 
on the issue of when a Rule 56(f) Motion should be granted. In 
Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667, 670 (3rd Cir. 1973), 
construing an almost identical federal rule, the Court held that "a 
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motion for continuance of a motion for summary judgment for 
purposes of discovery should ordinarily be granted almost as a 
matter of course." Id. at 670. In Kennedy v. Gray, 807 P.2d 670 
(Kan. 1991), the Court noted that Summary Judgment should rarely be 
granted as long as pretrial discovery remains incomplete. Id. at 
674. In Kennedy, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed a Summary 
Judgment in part because the nonmoving party had been deprived of 
a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery before attempting to 
resist the motion. As in the case at bar, the Summary Judgment was 
reversed even though some of the nonmoving party's outstanding 
discovery requests had not been propounded until after the Motion 
for Summary Judgment had been filed. 
In Carter v. Jerniqan, 227 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1975), an action 
was brought by various citizen plaintiffs to enjoin the State 
Commission for the Blind from converting commission funds for 
personal use. The Trial Court was openly skeptical of the 
plaintiffs' ability to establish a cognizable claim, and granted 
Summary Judgment before the plaintiffs had been able to complete 
their pretrial discovery. In reversing the Summary Judgment, the 
Iowa Supreme Court noted: 
Defendant's argument [regarding the 
propriety of an injunction] begs the question. 
How do we know whether an injunction is 
appropriate until we know the facts? The very 
purpose of the modern discovery rule allowing 
prior discovery is to learn the facts so that 
the court can apply the appropriate 
substantive rule of law. 
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We thus hold that the Trial Court should 
have overruled defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and permitted plaintiffs to pursue 
discovery. 
Id. at 136. 
In Raitport v. National Bureau of Standards, 385 F. Supp. 1221 
(E.D. Pa. 1974), a private citizen sued the United States and the 
National Bureau of Standards challenging the government's rejection 
of his proposal to create a federally sponsored bank to provide 
loans for technologically oriented small businesses. Many of the 
plaintiff's theories of recovery were, to say the least, novel. 
The defendants presented competent evidence that they had several 
rational, sufficient reasons to reject plaintiff's proposal. 
Nevertheless, the District Court delayed ruling on the defendants' 
Motions for Summary Judgment because of the possibility, "however 
remote," that further discovery would furnish some factual support 
for plaintiff's claims. Id. at 1226. 
U.S. Elevator completely fails to raise, in its responsive 
Brief, any suggestion that it would have been prejudiced by waiting 
an additional thirty (30) days for a ruling on its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Balanced against Rosado's very real interest in 
proceeding to trial on the merits, or at least having the Summary 
Judgment Motion resolved on substantive rather than procedural 
grounds, U.S. Elevator's interest in bringing the litigation to a 
conclusion one month sooner seems exceedingly weak. 
In the majority of Utah cases in which Trial Courts have been 
upheld in the exercise of their discretion to reject a Rule 56(f) 
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Motion for Continuance, significant, substantial discovery had 
already been done or, in the alternative, it was abundantly clear 
that additional discovery would serve no purpose. That is not the 
case here. 
POINT II 
THE MAINTENANCE LOGS TO WHICH ROSADO 
REFERRED DURING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING 
DID RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
Rosado submits that the few documents U.S. Elevator was 
willing to produce prior to the Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing 
did raise a genuine issue of material fact. (See pages 13 - 15 of 
Rosado's original Brief.) 
U.S. Elevator argues that this evidence was not properly 
before the Court at the time of the Summary Judgment Hearing. Even 
accepting that that proposition is true, whose fault was that? 
U.S. Elevator makes it clear in its Brief that Rosado needed to 
resist its Motion for Summary Judgment with expert testimony. 
Could Rosado realistically have an expert review the documents 
produced five days prior to the hearing and return them to Utah 
with a signed affidavit? U.S. Elevator tries to have it both ways 
— arguing that Rosado should have resisted the Motion for Summary 
Judgment with an expert's affidavit and, at the same time, claiming 
that Rosado presumably had enough time to get an expert to review 
the documents and create an appropriate affidavit on such short 
notice. 
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Rosado wishes to point out that it would have done little good 
for his expert to examine the accident scene months after the 
accident. Whatever improper adjustment in the elevator doors which 
might have caused or contributed to Rosado's injuries was probably 
repaired within a few weeks of Rosado's injury. This 
is not a case where alternative methods of discovery were 
realistically available to Rosado. The only reasonable way Rosado 
could commence discovery against U.S. Elevator was to propound 
written discovery requests like the ones Rosado used. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
A. Elevator Doors Do not Ordinarily Crush the Limbs of 
Users Absent Some Negligence bv the Entity Responsible 
for Adjusting and Maintaining the Door. 
The first element of Res Ipsa Loquitur is a showing that the 
accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily happen absent some 
negligence. U.S. Elevator admits that Rosado need not eliminate 
all possible inferences of non-negligence, but must merely 
establish that the balance of probabilities is such as to favor a 
finding of negligence, citing to Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719 
(Utah 1985). Rosado quite agrees. As anyone who has used an 
elevator knows, a moving door is supposed to reverse upon contact 
with an outstretched hand. How can U.S. Elevator seriously contend 
that the "balance of probabilities" weighs in favor of a finding of 
non-negligence given the extraordinary manner in which this 
accident happened? 
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U.S. Elevator claims, quite predictably, that Rosado will 
eventually have to prove negligence in this case with expert 
testimony. Although Rosado does intend to employ the services of 
an expert, any layman who has used an elevator will agree with the 
proposition that closing elevator doors should not crush a user's 
limb. 
It is significant that U.S. Elevator does not suggest, in its 
responsive Brief, any explanation for how the door injured Rosadofs 
hand. 
Other courts have applied the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in 
very similar elevator cases. Although Rosado recognizes that some 
courts have refused to apply the doctrine to elevator claims, 
Rosado submits that the better-reasoned decisions do so. In Giles 
v. City of New Haven. 619 A.2d 476 (Conn. App. 1993), attached as 
Addendum "A", the plaintiff was injured when a "compensation chain" 
on the subject elevator failed. The plaintiff was unable to 
present direct evidence of malfunction of the elevator, or of any 
defect in the compensation chain, maintenance related or otherwise, 
but instead relied upon the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in order 
to require the submission of the defendant's negligence to the 
jury. Id. at 478. In reversing a grant of Summary Judgment for 
the owner of the subject building and a directed verdict for the 
manufacturer of the elevator, the Connecticut Court of Appeals 
agreed that the plaintiff's accident was such that it would not 
have occurred unless someone was negligent — despite the 
11 
plaintiff's inability to present direct evidence of negligence. 
Id. at 478. 
B. Rosado did not "Control'1 the Adjustment and 
Maintenance of the Leading Edge Reverse Mechanism on the 
Subject Door. 
U.S. Elevator argues, with respect to the second prong of Res 
Ipsa Loquitur which inquires into the nature of the defendant's 
control over the injury-producing device, that Rosado "controlled" 
the elevator or shared in its control so that the doctrine is 
inapplicable. U.S. Elevator misses the point — Rosado used the 
elevator. He did not maintain, control, or adjust the leading edge 
reverse mechanism on the door which should have caused the door to 
reverse when it came in contact with Rosadofs hand. 
Subsequent to the Trial Court's dismissal of U.S. Elevator, 
Rosado's deposition was taken by the manufacturer of the elevator 
door. Rosado's testimony concerning the operation of the door at 
this time of his injury is quite significant: 
Q: (by Mr. Fowler) My question is, do you 
recall that your action of putting your hand 
against the inside of the door caused the 
runner or plastic leading edge to be depressed 
against the door? 
Mr. Nielson: Do you remember whether your 
hand made contact with that? 
The witness: I made contact with it, but, 
see, the problem is if it made contact, then 
why did the door keep going? 
Q: (by Mr. Fowler) When you say it made 
contact with it, are you talking the door or 
that pressure edge? 
A: I am saying when the door was closing. 
12 
Q: Right• 
A: You know, it's like, you know, when you 
got your hands around that, doesn't it push 
in? 
Q: And your memory is that you put your 
hands around it and pushed it in? 
A: Yah. 
Q: And it didn't respond by opening again? 
A: No. 
Rosado Deposition pages 135 - 136. Rosado did not "control" the 
leading edge mechanism which he depressed in an attempt to get the 
door to stop prior to his injury. He merely used it. This action 
is not "control" in the sense that that word is employed for the 
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. 
The Court in Giles v. City of New Haven. Supra. declined to 
force the plaintiff to show that the defendant had exclusive 
control of the elevator before applying the doctrine: 
[E]xclusive control is not required in order 
to submit a case to the jury on the theory of 
res ipsa loquitur. Rather, the control 
element requires a balancing test in which a 
court must determine whether a rational basis 
exists for concluding that it was more 
probable than not that the plaintiff's 
injuries were attributable to the defendant's 
negligence. 
Id. at 481. 
Also relevant to the control issue is the case of Ferguson v. 
Westincrhouse Electric Corp., 408 S.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1981) (Holding 
that an elevator is "uniquely under the control and maintenance" of 
the manufacturer and maintenance company and that the Doctrine of 
Res Ipsa Loquitur is particularly applicable in elevator cab 
cases); see also Coleman v. Otis Elevator Co,, 582 So.2d 341 (La. 
App. 4th Cir. 1991). 
In Swann v. Prudential Ins., 628 A.2d 989 (Md. App. 1993), 
attached as Addendum "B", the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that 
a Trial Court "[M]ust instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur if it 
believes the jury, after considering all the evidence, or making 
rational inferences therefrom, could reasonably find that the 
plaintiff proved each element by a preponderance of the evidence." 
Id. at 1001. The Swann Court applied the Doctrine of Res Ipsa 
Loquitur to plaintiff's elevator-injury claim. The discussion in 
Swann concerning Res Ipsa Loquitur is exhaustively researched. The 
Court noted the following with respect to the "exclusive control" 
element of Res Ipsa Loquitur: 
The majority of states considering the 
exclusive control issue under facts similar to 
those sub iudice have concluded that an 
elevator maintenance company is in exclusive 
control of an elevator it services. 
Id. at 1007. 
Citing an earlier New York case, the Swann Court stated: 
*Exclusivity1 is a relative term, not an 
absolute. *The logical basis for [the 
control] requirement is simply that it must 
appear that the negligence of which the thing 
speaks is probably that of the defendant and 
not of another.' 
Id. at 1007. 
By analogy, suppose a customer enters a lawn mower shop. He 
starts one of the display models. While the engine is idling, the 
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blade flies off and severely injures the customer's foot. 
Although, in a technical sense, it is true that the customer 
"controlled" the lawn mower at the time of his injury, the Doctrine 
of Res Ipsa Loquitur would be fully applicable. 
C. Rosado did not Contribute to his Injuries by 
Attempting to Depress the Leading Edge Rather than 
Withdrawing from all Contact with the Closing Elevator 
Door. 
U.S. Elevator argues that Rosado "obviously" contributed to 
his own injuries by trying to stop the elevator door open rather 
than simply retreating from such a vicious instrumentality. It is 
doubtful whether any member of this Court has not, within the last 
ten days, attempted to hold an elevator door open by depressing the 
doorfs leading edge. Attached as an Addendum "C" to this Reply 
Brief is a twelve page excerpt from Rosado's deposition wherein he 
explains how the accident occurred. In essence, Rosado was injured 
when he attempted to halt the progress of the closing elevator 
door. The door continued to close against his hand, pinning it 
against the elevator wall. The door's leading edge was completely 
unresponsive to Rosado's efforts. Rosado had no notice that the 
door would behave this way. He assumed, reasonably, that the door 
would react just as all other elevator doors are supposed to react 
— by reversing upon contact with the leading edge. 
In Giles, Supra. the Court stated that even if the plaintiff 
had, in some way, contributed to her own injuries, that would not, 
as a matter of law, prevent the application of Res Ipsa Loquitur: 
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With the adoption of the doctrine of 
comparative negligence, a plaintiff can be a 
participant in the events leading up to the 
injury suffered without depriving the 
plaintiff of the use of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur so long as the plaintiff was not 
the sole cause of the injuries. 
Id. at 480. Even if Rosado can be said to have contributed to his 
own injuries by trying to stop a closing elevator door — something 
a vast majority of elevator users do — he was still entitled to 
submit a claim under the theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Trial Court 
granting U.S. Elevator's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 1993. 
DIUMENTI, LEWIS & HART 
G. Eric Nielson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
A. Giles v. Citv of New Haven. 619 A.2d 476 (Conn. 
App. 1993). 
B. Swann v. Prudential Ins.. 620 A.2d 989 (Md. App. 1993). 
C. Pages 123 through 135 of Rosado's Deposition. 
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Tab A 
476 ^om». «19 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
HI 
The defendant further posits that the 
jury instructions on the duty to retreat 
relieved the state of its burden of proving 
that the defendant knew that he could re-
treat with complete safety.10 At trial, the 
defendant failed to object to the trial 
court's instruction concerning self-de-
fense.11 The defendant concedes that this 
claim was not preserved before the trial 
court, but seeks 1107this court's review un-
der the doctrine of State v. Golding, supra. 
The defendant asserts that a constitutional 
violation clearly exists and clearly deprived 
him of a fair trial. He also asserts that the 
state cannot prove the harmlessness of the 
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We are unpersuaded that Golding 
review is warranted. 
[101 When examining a trial court's in-
structions to a jury, we "do not engage in a 
microscopic examination of the charge, dis-
secting it line by line, nor do we consider 
the challenged portions of the charge in 
isolation." State v. Andrews, supra, 29 
Conn.App. at 540, 616 A.2d 1148; State v. 
Wolff, 29 Conn.App. 524, 531, 616 A.2d 
1143 (1992). We consider the instructions 
as a whole to determine whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the jury was 
misled by the charge. State v. Caston-
guay, 218 Conn. 486, 498, 590 A.2d 901 
(1991); State v. Andrews, supra. "Jury 
instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect 
or technically accurate They must be 
correct in law, adapted to the issues pre-
sented in the case and sufficient to guide 
the jury in reaching a verdict." (Citations 
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 
State v. Wolff supra. 
10. In charging the jury on the issue of self-
defense, the trial court instructed the jury that 
the defendant "may justifiably use deadly force 
if he reasonably believes that the other person is 
using or about to use deadly physical force, or 
secondly, the other person or persons was about 
to inflict great bodily harm upon him. The law 
does not encourage the use of deadly force and 
in most circumstances a person must retreat 
from the perceived harm about to be inflicted 
upon him. However, here we have the testimo-
ny, and it is up to you to believe or not, as to 
how the defendant, with the other witness, went 
[111 Reviewing the charge as a whole, 
we conclude that the trial court's instruc-
tions to the jury were accurate and suffi-
cient to guide them in reaching their ver-
dict. In its charge, the court discussed at 
length the law regarding self-defense. It 
informed the jury that the state must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant did not act in self-defense. The court 
read verbatim the elements and justifica-
tions for the use of self-defense and deadly 
force. See General Statutes §§ 53a-19, 
53a-100. After correctly stating the law 
concerning the duty to retreat,12 the court 
added that lio8u[t]he defendant is not re-
quired to retreat if he is in his home or 
dwelling." Because the defendant cannot 
show that the trial court's charge on self-
defense clearly deprived him of a fair trial, 
we will not review his claims. State v. 
Golding, supra. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
In this opinion the other Judges 
concurred. 
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I ^ Louise GILES 
v. 
CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. 
No. 10952. 
Appellate Court of Connecticut. 
Argued Oct. 2, 1992. 
Decided Jan. 26, 1993. 
Elevator operator sued manufacturer 
and building owner for personal injuries 
into the kitchen. That is up to you to decide." 
(Emphasis added.) 
11. The state argues that the defendant not only 
failed to object to the instruction concerning 
self-defense, but, in fact, endorsed the instruc-
tion by stating, "I will tell the court I think the 
court gave a very fair charge on justifica-
tion " 
12. See footnote 10, supra. 
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allegedly stemming from defective and 
poorly inspected elevator. The Superior 
Court, Judicial District of New Haven, 
McKeever and DeMayo, JJ., granted sum-
mary judgment for owner and directed ver-
dict on judgment of jury for manufacturer. 
Operator appealed. The Appellate Court, 
Dupont, C.J., held that: (1) elevator opera-
tor was entitled to have court submit res 
ipsa loquitur theory to jury in operator's 
action based on claim that elevator manu-
facturer or building owner was negligent, 
and (2) manual control of elevator by opera-
tor did not negate any supposition that 
building owner had exclusive control over 
elevator for purposes of application of res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
Reversed; new trial. 
1. Trial <S=>168 
Directed verdicts are not favored but 
may be upheld if jury could not reasonably 
and legally have reached conclusion other 
than in moving party's favor. 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>927(7) 
In reviewing trial court's action in di-
recting verdict for defendant, and subse-
quently refusing to set aside verdict, court 
views evidence in light most favorable to 
plaintiff. 
3. Negligence <s=*121.2(9) 
When doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is 
invoked, jury may infer negligence even 
absent direct evidence of negligence. 
4. Negligence «=»121.2(9, 10) 
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur neither 
creates presumption in plaintiff's favor nor 
shifts burden to defendant, but merely per-
mits inference of negligence to be drawn 
from circumstances of incident. 
5. Negligence e=> 121.2(3) 
To submit case to jury on theory of res 
ipsa loquitur, situation causing injury must 
be such that, in ordinary course of events, 
no injury would result unless from careless 
construction, inspections or use, both in-
spection and user must have been in con-
trol of party charged with neglect, and 
dangerous condition must have happened 
regardless of any voluntary action by 
jured party. 
6. Negligence <S^121.2(12) 
For purposes of determining whethc 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, coui 
takes into account how accidents of partici 
lar kind usually occur and, if court decide 
that probability of nonnegligent causes ar 
as great or greater than probability of nej 
ligent cause attributable to defendant 
court withdraws case from jury. 
7. Carriers £=»:*]6(10) 
Products Liability <S=>77 
Klevator operator was entitled to hav 
court submit res ipsa loquitur theory t< 
jury in operator's action based on clain 
that elevator manufacturer or buildinj 
owner was negligent; even if operato 
were contributorily negligent in reversing 
elevator direction, any negligence wouk 
only reduce amount of damages and no 
bar case from being submitted to jury 
8. Negligence e=>121.2(7) 
Under doctrine of comparative negli 
gence, plaintiff can be participant in event« 
leading up to injuries suffered without de 
priving plaintiff of use of doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur as long as plaintiff was not 
sole cause of injury. 
9. Carriers €=3316(10) 
Manual control of elevator by operator 
did not negate any supposition that build-
ing owner had exclusive control over eleva-
tor for purposes of application of res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine. 
10. Negligence ®=>I21.2(8) 
In jurisdiction with comparative negli-
gence, exclusive control is not required in 
order to submit case to jury on theory of 
res ipsa loquitur; exclusive control is not 
requirement for application of doctrine. 
1 i4«>St<»ven J. DeFrank, with whom, on the 
brief, was David A. I^ff, New Haven, for 
appellant (plaintiff). 
Constance L. ftpstein, Hartford, for ap-
pellee (defendant Otis Elevator Co.). 
Before DUPONT, C.J., and LA VERY 
and FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ. 
DUPONT, Chief Judge. 
The plaintiff appeals from a directed ver-
dict, granted by the trial court at the close 
of the plaintiffs case, in favor of the defen-
dant Otis Elevator Company l in an action 
for personal injuries, claiming that the trial 
court improperly directed a verdict for the 
defendant.2 The sole issue of the appeal is 
whether the trial court should have con-
cluded, as a matter of law, that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur could be applied, 
and, therefore, that the case should have 
been submitted to the jury. We conclude 
that the court should have done so, and, 
therefore, that it was improper for the trial 
court to direct a verdict for the defendant. 
The plaintiff brought suit against the 
defendant alleging that the defendant was 
negligent in failing to inspect, maintain and 
repair the elevator that she was operating, 
including its compensation chain' and in 
failing to warn her of the defective com-
pensation chain. The plaintiff argues that 
she presented sufficient evidence for the 
jury to infer negligence of the defendant 
because it failed to inspect, maintain and 
repair the compensation chain of the eleva-
tor, and that, therefore, the case should 
have been submitted to the jury under the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We agree. 
[1*2] ii5pDirected verdicts are not fa-
vored, but may be upheld if the jury could 
not reasonably and legally have reached a 
conclusion other than in the moving party's 
favor. Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 244, 
510 A.2d 1337 (1986); Merola v. Bums, 21 
Conn.App. 633, 636, 575 A.2d 1025 (1990). 
In reviewing the trial court's action in di-
recting a verdict for the defendant, and 
subsequently refusing to set aside the ver-
dict, we must view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. Petyan v. 
1. We refer herein to the defendant Otis Elevator 
Company as the defendant. The prior granting 
of summary judgment for the defendant city of 
New Haven is not part of this appeal. 
2. The plaintiff also claims that the trial court 
should not have admitted certain evidence. In 
view of our disposition of her first claim, it is 
unnecessary to reach the second claim. 
Ellis, supra; Merola v. Burns, supra. A 
plaintiffs case may be established by infer-
ences drawn from circumstantial evidence, 
but such inferences must be logical and 
reasonable, and cannot be based on mere 
conjecture and speculation. Boehm v. 
Kish, 201 Conn. 385, 389, 517 A.2d 624 
(1986); Merola v. Burns, supra. 
The plaintiff's claim is dependent on 
whether the trial court as a matter of law 
could conclude that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur should be applied, and the case be 
allowed to go to the jury. The plaintiff 
presented no direct evidence of malfunction 
of the elevator, nor of any defect in the 
compensation chain, maintenance related or 
otherwise, to require the submission of the 
question of the defendant's negligence to 
the jury, but instead relies on the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur in order to require the 
submission of the defendant's negligence 
to the jury. 
[3,4] When the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur is invoked, it permits the jury to 
infer negligence when no direct evidence of 
negligence has been introduced. Malvicini 
v. Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., 206 Conn. 
439, 441-42, 538 A.2d 690 (1988); Schur-
gast v. Schumann, 156 Conn. 471, 479-81, 
242 A.2d 695 (1968). The doctrine neither 
creates a presumption in favor of the plain-
tiff nor shifts the burden to the defendant, 
but merely permits the inference of negli-
gence to be drawn from the circumstances 
of the incident. Malvicini v. Stratfield 
Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 Conn, at 442, 
538 A.2d 690; Ryan v. George L. Lilley 
Co.,^51121 Conn. 26, 30, 183 A.2 (1936). 
Thus, the doctrine allows the plaintiff to 
avoid a directed verdict without directly 
establishing negligence. It is a rule of 
circumstantial evidence that allows an in-
ference of negligence if the accident is a 
type that ordinarily does not occur in the 
3. A compensation chain is a balancing mecha-
nism that compensates for the transfer of 
weight during an elevator's operation. The 
chain involved in this case was approximately 
120 feet in length, extending through the twelve 
stories of the building, and weighed approxi-
mately 360 pounds. 
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absence of a defendant's negligence. The 
doctrine allows an inference to be drawn as 
to why the accident happened. Malvicini 
v. Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra. 
The determination of whether the doctrine 
applies is a question of law. Id., 206 Conn, 
at 443, 538 A.2d 690. 
[5] In Connecticut, three conditions 
must be met for a case to be submitted to 
the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
They are as follows: " '(1) The situation, 
condition, or apparatus causing the injury 
must be such that in the ordinary course of 
events no injury would result unless from a 
careless construction, inspection or user. 
(2) Both inspection and user must have 
been at the time of the injury in the control 
of the party charged with neglect. (3) The 
injurious occurrence or condition must have 
happened irrespective of any voluntary ac-
tion at the time by the party injured.' " 
Id., quoting Schurgast v. Schumann, su-
pra. 
[6] Whether the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applies is a matter of law for the 
initial determination of the trial court, and, 
therefore, the court must examine the pos-
sible causes of the occurrences in order to 
determine whether the case should be sub-
mitted to the jury. Watzig v. Tobin, 292 
Or. 645, 651 n. 5, 642 P.2d 651 (1982). The 
court takes into account how accidents of 
this kind usually occur and the evidence 
introduced; id.; applying common sense as 
t factor in the mix. Malvicini v. Strat-
field Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 Conn, at 
448, 538 A.2d 690. If the court decides 
"that the probabilities of non-negligent 
causes are as great or greater than the 
probability of a negligent cause attribut-
able to the defendant [the court] withdraws 
the case from the jury." Watzig v. Tobin, 
supra. On the other hand, if by using the 
evidence and | ^ t h e trial court's own under-
standing of how similar accidents occur, 
the court concludes that the probability of 
a negligent cause attributable to the defen-
dant is as great or greater than the proba-
bility of nonnegligent causes, then the case 
is submitted to the jury. "The conclusion 
thus reached by the trial judge is tentative 
only because the jury may conclude other-
(Conn.App. 1993) 
wise." Id. When the court is of the opin 
ion that the probability of the defendant's 
negligence is greater than the probability 
of other causes, the jury is entitled to reacl 
the same conclusion. Id. 
In this case, the trial court could reason 
ably have considered certain facts in deter 
mining whether the doctrine of res ipsj 
loquitur applies. For fourteen years, th( 
plaintiff was an elevator operator for on< 
of the three elevators in the Powell Build 
ing in New Haven. On the date her inju 
ries were sustained, the elevator she was 
operating was ascending from the first 
floor to the twelfth floor when its compen 
sation chain became hooked on a rail brack 
et located on the wall of the elevator shaft 
The plaintiff was not able to control the 
movement of the chain from the interior ot 
the cab. Once hooked, the chain then tight 
ened up and broke free from two bolts 
securing it to the underside of the cab 
The cab began to shudder and shake, and 
the plaintiff struck her head and shoulder 
against the walls of the cab. The chair 
then fell to the bottom of the elevator shaft 
with a loud crash, which frightened the 
plaintiff. Upon hearing the crash, the 
plaintiff, fearing for her safety, reversed 
the direction of the elevator as it was ap-
proaching the twelfth floor. She directed 
the elevator to the nearest floor, the elev-
enth, where she jumped from the cab sus-
taining additional injuries. At the time the 
plaintiff received her injuries, the defen-
dant had a longstanding exclusive contract 
with the building owner to maintain and 
inspect the elevator and its component 
parts The elevator was installed |
 ir>tby the 
defendant approximately sixty-one years 
before the accident. William Hendry, the 
defendant's district maintenance supervi-
sor, testified that the accident was caused 
by the compensation chain's becoming 
hooked on a rail bracket in the elevator 
shaft due to excessive sway of the chain. 
Hendry further testified that the elevators 
were routinely inspected, but that neither 
inspection nor testing of the compensation 
chain was part of that routine inspection. 
The bolts that held the compensation chain 
to the underside of the elevator cab were 
never changed, and no one other than the 
aeienaant company touched the compensa-
tion chain or the bolts. 
On cross-examination, Hendry testified 
that the normal sway of a compensation 
chain is approximately one to two inches, 
and in order for the chain to get hooked on 
a rail bracket it must sway at least eigh-
teen inches. He further testified that for 
the chain to sway eighteen inches there 
must be some misoperation of the elevator, 
such as rapid reversals of direction. He 
had never before seen a compensation 
chain pulled free of an elevator cab in his 
thirty-seven years of employment by the 
defendant. He further stated that on one 
occasion he had seen the plaintiff make 
rapid reversals of direction of the elevator. 
The plaintiff, however, testified that her 
ascension from the first to the twelfth floor 
was routine until she approached the 
twelfth floor, and that the cab began to 
shake and sway before she reversed its 
direction to the eleventh floor. She further 
testified that the crash of the compensation 
chain as it hit the bottom of the elevator 
shaft occurred before she reversed the di-
rection of the cab. If a jury believed that 
she did not do anything to cause the shak-
ing of the cab or the dislodging of the 
chain, her act of reversing the direction 
could not be found to have caused the 
occurrence. 
[7,8] [i.^ We conclude that the plaintiff 
presented sufficient evidence as to each 
element required by the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur for the court to have submitted 
the question of its application to the jury. 
As for the first element, we agree with the 
parties that the accident would not have 
occurred unless someone was negligent. 
We also conclude that the third element for 
application of the doctrine was satisfied. 
The plaintiff maintains that she was not 
contributorily negligent. The defendant 
argues that she was. We conclude that 
even if she were contributorily negligent in 
reversing the direction of the elevator, in a 
jurisdiction that applies the doctrine of 
comparative negligence, such as Connecti-
cut, any negligence on the plaintiffs part 
would only reduce the amount of damages, 
rather than bar the case from being sub-
mitted to the jury. See Malvicini v. Strat-
field Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 Conn, at 
444, 538 A.2d 690; Watzig v. Tobin, supra,] 
292 Or. at 650 n. 4, 642 P.2d 651.| With the] 
[adoption of the doctrine of comparative 
negligence, a plaintiff can be a participant 
in the events leading up to the injuries 
suffered without depriving the plaintiff of 
the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
as long as the plaintiff was not the sole 
I cause of the injuries, f See Malvicini v. \ 
Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra. The 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply 
even if the plaintiff's actions contributed to 
the injury. Watzig v. Tobin, supra. 
[9] The plaintiff claims that the element 
of control that is necessary for an applica-
tion of the doctrine has been met because 
she did not have any control over the com-
pensation chain. She testified that she 
never touched any of the exterior parts of 
the elevator, and that her operation of the 
elevator did not constitute control of the 
elevator. She asserts that the defendant 
had exclusive control of the compensation 
chain because of the defendant's exclusive 
contract to maintain the elevator and its 
parts. The defendant argues that the con-
trol element was not met because the plain-
tiff manually | ^controlled the upward and 
downward movement of the elevator, there-
by indirectly controlling the compensation 
chain. Because the compensation chain 
was attached to the elevator and responded 
to the movements of the elevator, the de-
fendant asserts that the plaintiff as the 
person in control of the elevator had con-
trol over its attached parts. Relying on 
Malvicini, the defendant claims that the 
manual control of the elevator by the plain-
tiff negates any supposition that the defen-
dant had exclusive control and therefore 
precludes^ the application of the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. The facts of Malvicini 
however, are distinguishable. 
In Malvicini, the plaintiff, a guest at the 
defendant's hotel, suddenly heard a "pssst" 
sound and was hit by steaming hot water 
while he was taking a shower, causing him 
to fall and suffer first degree burns as well 
as a concussion and other injuries. The 
trial court refused to charge the jury on 
Cite M 619 A.2d 481 
the theory of res ipsa loquitur, and the 
plaintiff appealed. Because there was evi-
dence that the plaintiff had adjusted the 
faucets on the day in question, as well as 
the night before, the Supreme Court held 
that the plaintiff failed to meet the control 
element of the theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
The complaint in Malvicini alleged that the 
defendant had exclusive control over the 
instrumentality, and, thus, the court dis-
cussed control in terms of exclusivity. In 
the present case, the plaintiff did not allege 
that the defendant had exclusive control 
over the instrumentality. Nor is such an 
allegation necessary in order to seek appli-
cation of the doctrine. 
The Malvicini court stated that in order 
"[fjor the control condition of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine to apply, the plaintiff 
must adduce evidence from which the 
court, as a matter of law, can properly 
determine that a jury could reasonably 
draw an inference that it is more probable 
that not that the person whose negligence 
caused the injury was the defendant and 
not iisesome other party." Malvicini v. 
Stratfield Motor Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 
Conn, at 446, 538 A.2d 690. This statement 
implies that, in a jurisdiction with compara-
tive negligence, exclusive control is not re-
quired in order to submit a case to the jury 
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Rather, 
the control element requires a balancing 
test in which a court must determine 
whether a rational basis exists for conclud-
ing that it was more probable than not that 
the plaintiff's injuries were attributable fro 
i the defendant's negligence.4 J Malvicini1 
cites Watzig with approval. Watzig makes 
it clear that control element used as a test 
for the application of the doctrine need not 
be exclusive. The submission of the case 
to the jury in Connecticut requires "control 
of the party charged with neglect." 
Schurgast v. Schumann, supra, 156 Conn, 
it 480, 242 A.2d 695. The adjective, "ex-
clusive" is conspicuously absent. Malvici-
ni makes it clear that exclusive control is 
not a requirement for application of the 
4. This balancing test has been followed in sever 
al jurisdictions thai have adopted comparative 
negligence. See Dermatossian v. New York City 
Tiansit Authority, 67 N.Y.2d 219, 501 N.Y.S.2d 
. . , . , >..r»^wi\ v \ m r . Conn. 48 
(Conn.App. 1993) 
doctrine, but rather a requirement that coi 
trol exists and that the application support 
fairness. Malvicini v. Stratfield Moto 
Hotel, Inc., supra, 206 Conn, at 446, 53 
A.2d 690. 
f 101 On the facts of this case, the tria 
court could reasonably have determines 
that the probability that the plaintiff's inju 
ries were attributable to the alleged negli 
gent actions of the defendant was as grea! 
or greater than the probability of a negli 
gent cause attributable to the plaintiff, and 
that, therefore, the case should have been 
submitted to the jury for its ultimate deter-
mination. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is 
remanded for a now trial. 
In this opinion the other Judges 
concurred. 
( O | K(V NUMBER SYSUM> 
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jj^The SAVINGS INSTITUTE 
v. 
KKNYON MANOR CORPORATION 
et al. 
No. 11291. 
Appellate Court of Connecticut. 
Argued Dec. 10, 1992. 
Decided Jan. 26, 1993. 
Mortgagee sought to foreclose mort-
gage, and life tenants claimed special de-
fense alleging that they were in possession 
under claim of right. The Superior Court, 
Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Robert 
Satter, J., struck special defense, and fol-
lowing trial, Freed, J., entered judgment of 
strict foreclosure from which tenants ap-
784, 492 N.Ii.2d I2O0 (1986); Want* v. Tobm. 
2^2 Or. 64S, 642 l\2d 6SI (1982); City of 
Mompcher v. Duranleau, 145 Vt. 237, 485 A.2d 
1269 (1984). 
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sue their claims in the March proceeding. 
There is ample evidence in the record to 
show that what Owens-Corning and Keene 
really wanted to do was to proceed against 
Fibreboard in a separate trial after the 
March trial had been completed. The trial 
judge was in the best position to under-
stand what the parties were asking for and 
make a determination based on what he 
heard. In light of the equivocal statements 
of counsel for Owens-Corning and Keene, 
we cannot say that the judge was clearly 
erroneous in concluding that they were 
standing on their claimed right to dismiss 
without prejudice or proceed at some fu-
ture time on their cross-claims. 
At oral argument, counsel for Owens-
Corning stated that Owens-Corning would 
have "preferred] to dismiss without preju-
dice and pursue these cross claims in anoth-
er proceeding." It is apparent that this 
was Owens-Corning's and Keene's first 
choice. This was not, however, the choice 
that the judge was willing to offer and by 
not insisting after March 10 that they 
wanted to try their case immediately, Ow-
ens-Corning and Keene acquiesced to the 
decision that was ultimately made.8 
141 One reason that Owens-Corning 
and Keene may have wanted to dismiss 
their cross-claims without prejudice at this 
point in the litigation was that they did not 
know the terms of the settlement between 
Fibreboard and the plaintiffs. In the last 
analysis, however, if Owens-Corning and 
Keene had thought that this was integral 
to their case, they had an obligation to 
raise the issue on March 12, when the 
judge needed to and was going to instruct 
the jury in this very complex case. By not 
doing so, they abandoned the issue and, 
thus, cannot now claim that they were prej-
udiced by the judge's denial of the motion 
to disclose the terms of the settlement 
agreement. 
Admittedly, the settlement between the 
plaintiffs and Fibreboard presented Ow-
ens-Corning and Keene with additional 
8. Based on the statement from counsel for Fi-
breboard on March 12 about perceived reme-
dies that Owens-Corning and Keene might have 
from a reviewing court, we might infer that they 
were hoping that the judge would make the 
problems. When the plaintiffs settled with 
Fibreboard, the burden of proving Fibre-
board's liability fell on Owens-Corning and 
Keene. At oral argument, counsel for Ow-
ens-Corning admitted that "if [plaintiffs] 
hadn't settled they would have done our job 
for us." Counsel for Owens-Corning and 
Keene insist that, regardless of the settle-
ment, they were ready to try their cases. 
The realignment of the parties brought 
about by the settlement placed the burden 
of proving Fibreboard's liability solely on 
Owens-Corning and Keene. The judge, 
however, had other legitimate consider-
ations that were paramount to those of 
Owens-Corning and Keene. 
Complex cases such as the one that gave 
rise to this appeal are a relatively new 
phenomenon. As in this case, one judge is 
faced with literally thousands of plaintiffs 
and hundreds of defendants. The burden 
falls on that judge to keep the case moving 
at an orderly pace without sacrificing due 
process rights. At the Annual Meeting of 
the Conference of Chief Justices, on July 
21, 1992, the State Judges Asbestos Litiga-
tion Committee presented a report entitled: 
"Megatorts: The Lessons of Asbestos Liti-
gation." The report states in part: 
"Due process demands fair and equitable 
judicial procedures. Realistic opportuni-
ties to present a case and rebut an adver* 
sary must be preserved. Moreover fair 
ness to all litigants cannot be ignored. 
The courts cannot provide ideal trials for 
asbestos plaintiffs at the expense of leav-
ing other parties waiting in a long queue 
to receive judicial attention The tra-
ditional competing goal to fairness is ef-
ficiency because courts have an obli-
gation to run economically. By stream-
lining pretrial processes, utilizing innova-
tive case management and conducting ex-
pedited trials more cases can be heard 
and settlements achieved. 
"In describing case management meth-
ods, the tension between fairness and 
decision he did and that, after an appeal, they 
could try their cross-claims in a separate pro-
ceeding. If this was indeed their strategy, the 
risks outweigh the benefits, as is evidenced by 
the results in this case. 
efficiency become obvious 
tive judges have found ways to increase 
both fairness and efficiency; others have 
had to make tradeoffs. However, all 
judges have learned to increase their 
abilities to accommodate both goals." 
In the instant case, the trial judge was 
ready to proceed with the trial, the jury 
had been empaneled and sworn, and some 
of the parties had given their opening 
statements. The judge, wanting to move 
the case forward, offered Owens-Coming 
and Keene a choice of dismissing their 
cross-claims with prejudice or going for-
ward with their cross-claims at trial. This 
was not the choice they wanted, but the 
trial judge made it clear that this was what 
was available to them. When they contin-
ued to balk, the trial judge merely did what 
he told them he would do, namely, grant 
their motion to dismiss, but with the condi-
tion of prejudice. We cannot say that he 
abused the discretion given to him by the 
Rules. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS. 
Cite u 620 A.2d 989 (Md.App. 1993) 
Some innova- judgment on jury verdict in favor of defen-
dants. Appeal and cross appeal were tak-
en. The Court of Special Appeals, Bishop, 
J., held that: (1) evidence of user's collater-
al source payments from workers' compen-
sation and medical disability plan was ad-
missible; (2) user was entitled to instruc-
tion on res ipsa loquitur; and (3) evidence 
of specific acts of negligence did not pre-
vent user from relying on doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded 
* KfYNUMBtRSYSHM 
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David SWANN 
v. 
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF AMERICA, et al. 
No. 658, Sept. Term, 1992. 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
Feb. 1, 1993. 
Reconsideration Denied March 30, 1993. 
Elevator user brought action against 
building owner and manager and elevator 
maintenance contractor to recover for inju-
ries caused by failure of elevator to level 
with floor. The Circuit Court, Montgomery 
County, DeLawrence Beard, J., entered 
Wilner, C.J., concurred in part, dissent-
ed in part, and filed opinion. 
1. Negligence <S=»130(1) 
Report by elevator consulting firm crit-
icizing building owner and manager and 
elevator maintenance contractor for inade-
quately stocking spare parts on site and 
failing to retain repair orders from service 
calls was not probative of notice, standard 
of care, or breach of duty in action to 
recover for injuries caused by failure of 
elevator to level with floor; report was 
prepared nine months after the incident. 
2. Negligence @=»129 
Evidence that elevator did not level 
with floor during incident after user was 
injured as result of misleveling was irrele-
vant in user's negligence action; it was 
undisputed that elevator did not level with 
floor at time of accident. 
3. Appeal and Error «=>1058(1) 
Evidence of elevator maintenance con-
tractor's document retention policy and pre-
ventative maintenance checklist was cumu-
lative of document retention policy admit-
ted into evidence and testimony that con-
tractor had preventive maintenance check-
list, and, thus, exclusion was harmless in 
negligence action to recover for injuries 
caused by failure of elevator to level with 
the floor. 
4. Negligence e=»125 
Evidence that elevator maintenance 
contractor knew of misleveling problems in 
other elevators was not material to user's 
negligence action against building owner 
and manager and elevator maintenance 
contractor for injuries caused by failure of 
elevator to \eve\ with the floor. 
5. Damages «=>182 
Evidence of elevator user's collateral 
source payments from workers' compensa-
tion and medical disability plan was admis-
sible in negligence action against building 
owner and manager and elevator service 
contractor to show motivation for not re-
turning to work following injury caused by 
failure of elevator to level with floor; 
user's job at time of injury was sedentary, 
medical experts testified that user was ca-
pable of sedentary work, user waa able to 
drive car for long periods of time, worked 
out at gym, and did household chores, and, 
thus, there was sufficient evidence of ma-
lingering or exaggeration. 
6. Pretrial Procedure «=»45, 753 
Technical violation of discovery rules 
and pretrial order by failing to timely iden-
tify expert witnesses to be called at trial 
did not prejudice plaintiff and, therefore, 
did not entitle him to exclusion of the ex-
perts' testimony; plaintiff deposed the ex-
perts prior to trial. 
7. Appeal and Error <s=»204(7) 
Challenge to opinion by witness who 
was not qualified as expert was waived by 
failure to object. Md.Rule 2-517(a). 
8. Evidence «=M71(17) 
Building manager's engineer did not 
need to be qualified as expert to testify 
whether anyone ever recommended to him 
that he should keep and maintain records 
of elevator company relating to any call-
backs, complaints, and maintenance of ele-
vator that caused injury to user by failing 
to level with floor; engineer could testify 
as lay witness to matters within firsthand 
knowledge. 
9. Appeal and Error «=»232(2) 
Objection to form of question did not 
preserve objection that question called for 
improper expert testimony. Md.Rule 2-
517(a). 
10. Evidence «=>474(1) 
Opinion by building manager's engi-
neer that he would have known about any 
problem concerning elevator's failure to 
level the floor was admissible despite fail-
ure to qualify engineer as expert; opinion 
was based on firsthand knowledge and was 
not typically given by expert. 
11. Evidence «=»474(1) 
Elevator maintenance contractor's re-
pairman did not need to be qualified as 
expert to testify that he never observed 
elevators mislevel by more than inch or 
two; the testimony was based on repair-
man's firsthand knowledge. 
12. Witnesses <$=»370(3) 
Injured elevator user's race discrimina-
tion suit against employer was relevant to 
reasons for receiving medical disability and 
to credibility in action against building 
owner and manager and elevator mainte-
nance company to recover for injuries 
caused by failure of elevator to level with 
floor; defendants maintained that user waa 
disgruntled employee who was being ha-
rassed by supervisor, that, contrary to his 
testimony, he would not have remained at 
employer until retirement age, that he was 
not motivated to return to work, and that 
employer was motivated to grant him medi-
cal disability. 
13. Trial «=*203(1), 252(1) 
Refusal to instruct jury is error as 
matter of law if instruction correctly states 
law and law is applicable in light of evi-
dence before jury. 
14. Negligence <3=>138(2) 
Trial court must instruct on res ipsa 
loquitur if it believes that jury, after con-
sidering the evidence, or making rational 
inferences therefrom, could reasonably find 
that plaintiff proved each element by pre-
ponderance of evidence. 
15. Negligence <s=>121.3 
Evidence of specific acts of negligence 
in repairing and maintaining elevator did 
not prevent injured user from relying on 
res ipsa loquitur; user did not purport to 
furnish complete explanation of accident 
caused by failure of elevator to level with 
floor, at close of evidence, there was dis-
pute as to what caused accident, and evf 
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dence of negligent repair and maintenance 
did not refute inference of negligence im-
plied by res ipsa loquitur. 
16. Negligence «=» 138(2) 
Elevator user who fell in elevator that 
had failed to level with floor was entitled to 
res ipsa loquitur instruction in action 
against maintenance contractor. 
17. Negligence <*=>121.3 
Elevator could be found to be within 
maintenance contractor's "exclusive con-
trol" within meaning of res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine, even though maintenance agree-
ment purported to place possession or con-
trol of elevator with building manager; 
contractor manufactured and installed ele-
vator, manager was obligated to prohibit 
others from making repairs or adjust-
ments, and nothing indicated that building 
owner, manager, or tenant attempted to 
repair elevator. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
18. Negligence «=»136(6, 27) 
Evidence created jury question wheth-
er elevator user was contributorily negli-
gent when he stepped into elevator that 
had not leveled with floor, and, thus, evi-
dence created jury question on element of 
res ipsa loquitur requiring plaintiff to es-
tablish that casualty did not result from act 
or omission of plaintiff. 
19. Negligence <&=>138(2) 
Plaintiff is entitled to res ipsa loquitur 
instruction only when plaintiff establishes 
casualty of sort which usually does not 
occur in absence of negligence and is 
caused by instrumentality within defen-
dant's exclusive control under circum-
stances indicating that casualty did not re-
sult from act or omission of plaintiff. 
20. Negligence <£=>121.2(6) 
Fact that mechanical, electrical, and 
electronic devices fail due to nonnegligent 
causes does not preclude application of res 
ipsa loquitur; element requiring proof that 
casualty is sort which usually does not 
occur in absence of negligence only re-
quires evidence for reasonable conclusion 
that negligence was more likely cause than 
other cansos 
21. Appeal and Error <s=>2Mi<l> 
Allegedly erroneous failure to give 
plaintiffs proposed instruction was not pre-
served, where plaintiffs did not object. 
22. Negligence <s=>15 
Alleged violation of building code as 
result of elevator's failure to level with 
floor was not evidence of negligence in 
injured user's action against building own-
er and manager and maintenance contrac-
tor; intent of building code was to make 
buildings accessible and usable by physical-
ly handicapped persons, and since user was 
not physically handicapped, he was not 
within class of persons sought to be pro-
tected. Code 1057, Art. 83B, § 6-102(a)(l). 
23. Negligence «=»139(1) 
Trial <s=>244(4) 
Instruction that landowner had duty to 
keep property in safe condition if open to 
public, could not delegate duty, and could 
not avoid or delegate risk of nonperfor-
mance of duty by person hired to perform 
maintenance would have overemphasized 
duty of building owner and manager, 
would have been unduly suggestive and 
prejudicial, and did not need to be given in 
action by injured elevator user against 
building owner and manager; jury had 
been fairly and comprehensively instructed 
as to duty of landowner to invitee, and trial 
court did not state that landowner's duty 
was delegable. 
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Appellant, David Swann ("Swann"), filed 
a complaint against Prudential Insurance 
Company of America ("Prudential"), Carey 
Winston Company ("CW"), and Dover Ele-
vator Company ("Dover") (hereinafter col-
lectively referred to as "Appellees") in the 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, al-
leging negligent maintenance of an eleva-
tor (Count I) and product liability (Count 
II). Swann dismissed Count II. A jury 
trial was held on Count I. At the close of 
Swann's case and at the conclusion of the 
trial, Prudential and CW moved for judg-
ment. The trial court denied their motions 
and the jury found in favor of Appellees. 
Swann filed a timely notice of appeal. Pru-
dential and CW filed a cross-appeal. 
Issues 
Swann's appeal 
I. Whether the trial court erred in ex-
cluding evidence concerning: 
(A) the elevator maintenance study 
performed by the Newmont Elevator 
Company; 
(B) post-accident misleveling incidents; 
(C) deposition testimony of corporate 
officials of Dover and national accident 
data of other elevator misleveling inci-
dents of Dover? 
II. Whether the trial court erred in ad-
mitting evidence concerning: 
(A) collateral source payments; 
(B) late disclosed expert witness opin-
ions; 
(C) opinions of witnesses neither dis-
closed nor qualified as expert witness-
es; 
(D) a race discrimination suit involving 
the appellant? 
III. Whether the trial court erred in 
failing to give: 
(A) a res ipsa loquitur instruction; 
(B) a missing evidence instruction; 
(C) an instruction that a violation of a 
statute can be considered evidence of 
negligence; and 
(D) an instruction that the duty owed 
to business invitees by a property own-
er is non-delegable? 
Prudential and CW's Cross-Appeal 
IV. Did the trial court err by denying 
Prudential's and CW's motions for 
judgment? 
(A) Was there evidence that Prudential 
and CW had notice of a misleveling 
problem? 
(B) Was there evidence that a breach 
of duty owed by CW proximately 
caused the elevator to mislevel on Feb-
ruary 2, 1987? 
Since we decide this appeal in favor of 
Prudential and CW based on issnes I, II, 
and III, we need not address their cross-
appeal. 
Facts 
On February 2, 1987, Swann and a co-
worker, Murtha Donovan, Jr. ("Donovan"), 
summoned an elevator (designated "elev* 
tor number two") located in their place of 
employment. When the elevator arrived, it 
did not level properly with the floor, and 
Swann tripped and stumbled while board-
ing. The elevator was "[sjomewhert 
around a foot," "[s]omewhat greater than 
about a foot," or as many as eighteen 
inches below floor level. Ordinarily, the 
height of the elevator's door opening was 
seven feet. As a result of the incident, 
Swann claimed he sustained severe, painful 
and permanent personal injuries. 
After the elevator arrived but before en-
tering it, Swann looked into the elevator 
and saw no exiting passengers. Neither 
Swann nor Donovan noticed the elevator 
had misleveled until after Swann stepped 
into the elevator. At trial, Swann's expert 
in the field of human factors psychology 
opined that when an elevator door opens, 
people ordinarily "look forward at essen-
tially their own eye level, first to see that 
the door opens; second, to see that nobody 
is coming out; and if there is time later on, 
there are two or three seconds available, to 
look towards the walking surface itself,1* 
When asked if he had an opinion "whether 
an elevator that was between six to twelve 
inches below the floor level would be able 
to be detected in sufficient time to allow 
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the person to keep from stepping in or 
falling into the elevator," he added: "If 
somebody knew to look, if they expected 
the problem to occur, yes; if they did not, 
no I would not normally expect people 
to do a safety inspection adequate to deter-
mine that the elevator has not leveled, be-
cause they would have no reason to do so." 
Elevator number two, an automatic self-
lervice elevator, was located in a building 
owned by Prudential, managed by CW, and 
leased exclusively to Swann's employer, 
IBM. Dover manufactured and installed 
the elevator, and has been under contract 
with CW to maintain the elevator ever 
since its installation. 
The Dover Master Maintenance Service 
Agreement ("the Agreement") in effect 
from July 1, 1985 through the date of the 
incident required that Dover "[r]egularly 
and systematically examine, adjust, lubri-
cate and, whenever required by the wear 
and tear of normal elevator usage, repair 
or replace the equipment (except for the 
items stated hereafter), using trained per-
sonnel directly employed and supervised by 
(Dover] to maintain the equipment in prop-
er operating condition." Although the 
Agreement specifically excludes several 
elevator components and associated sys-
tems, the component that Swann contends 
caused the misleveling, the "14 and 15 con-
tacts", was not excluded. Further, CW 
agreed that it shall remain in exclusive 
"possession or control of the equipment" 
and that it would prohibit "others [from] 
mak[ing] changes, adjustments, additions, 
repairs or replacements to the equipment." 
When an elevator needed repair, IBM 
contacted CW. CW did not attempt to re-
pair the elevators; rather, it turned the 
elevator off when a problem arose and 
placed a call to Dover. Joan Berman, CW's 
senior vice-president in charge of property 
management, testified that "[CW] cannot 
do anything on th[e] elevator . . . [b]ecause 
the only people that are allowed to work on 
the elevator based on the [Agreement] are 
the people who come from Dover Eleva-
tor." David Geist, CW's chief building en-
gineer, testified that he was not permitted 
to work on the elevator. When asked why, 
• (Md.App. 1993) 
he responded: "(because that is why we 
have a contract with Dover to repair the 
elevators. 1 do not know anything about 
repairing (tie elevators." 
Ronald Bothell (" Bothell"), a mainte-
nance repairman for Dover, testified that 
he would spend six hours every other week 
performing preventive maintenance on the 
four elevators in Prudential's building. On 
as many as four occasions within a span of 
six weeks preceding the incident—Decem-
ber 17, 198b\ January 7, 1987, January 21, 
1987, and January 28, 1987—and on the 
day of the incident, Dover was advised of 
misleveling problems with elevator number 
two. A repair order dated January 7 indi-
cates that the 14 and 15 contacts were 
"burned closed" and that Bothell cleaned 
the contacts and replaced brushes. Ac-
cording to Donald Moynihan ("Moynihan"), 
Swann's expert in the field of elevator engi-
neering, installation, design, and mainte-
nance, elevator number two misleveled be-
cause the 14 and 15 contacts were filed 
clean rather than replaced. Although Do-
ver did not present expert testimony on 
elevator maintenance and repair, Bothell 
testified that the elevator could not have 
misleveled any more than an inch based 
upon his observations and experience and, 
in any event, cleaning the 14 and 15 con-
tacts was proper and adequate because the 
contacts were not welded together, they 
merely had an accumulation of crystallized 
dust particles. 
Other facts will be provided, infra, as 
appropriate to the discussion. 
Discussion 
I 
Swann first contends that the trial court 
erred when it excluded testimony and other 
evidence that was both relevant and mate-
rial to the issues in dispute. 
"For an item of evidence to be admissi-
ble, it must be both relevant and materi-
al. Kvidence is material if it tends to 
establish a proposition that has legal sig-
nificance to the litigation. Evidence is 
relevant if it is sufficiently probative of a 
proposition that, if established, would 
have legal significance to the litigation." 
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Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 284, 291, 563 
A.2d 392 (1989) (quoting Paige v. Manu-
zak, 57 Md.App. 621, 632, 471 A.2d 758, 
cert, denied, 300 Md. 154, 476 A.2d 722 
(1984)). This notwithstanding, we must ad-
here to "the long-standing principle that 
the admission or exclusion of evidence is a 
function of the trial court which, on appeal, 
is traditionally viewed with great latitude." 
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 60 Md. 
App. 104, 118, 481 A.2d 250 (1984), rev'd on 
other grounds, 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 
(1985). "An appellate court will only re-
verse upon finding that the trial judge's 
determination was 'both manifestly wrong 
and substantially injurious.' " Lomax v. 
Comptroller of the Treasury, 88 Md.App. 
50, 54, 591 A.2d 1311 (1991) (quoting 
Paige, 57 Md.App. at 633, 471 A.2d 758). 
With these principles in mind, we shall 
consider whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to admit the evidence 
Swann proffered. 
(A) 
Newmont Elevator Company Study 
[ 1 ] Swann offered evidence of an evalu-
ation report the Newmont Elevator Compa-
ny (an elevator consulting firm) prepared 
at Prudential's request. According to 
Swann, the report criticized Appellees for 
failing adequately to stock spare parts on 
site and failing to retain repair orders from 
Dover's service calls. Swann argues that 
the study is relevant and material to two 
issues: first, the inadequate supply of 
spare parts is relevant to the jury's resolu-
tion of whether a particular electrical con-
tact should have been replaced during the 
service call immediately prior to the inci-
dent; and second, the failure to maintain 
call back and repair order records prevent-
ed recognition of the pattern of misleveling 
incidents occurring before the incident. 
Swann contends the study defines the stan-
dard of care owed by Appellees with re-
spect to the care and maintenance of the 
elevator and therefore, is an exception to 
the rule excluding evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures. 
Appellees point out, however, that the 
study was not prepared until November 
1987—nine months after the incident—and, 
therefore, the trial court properly excluded 
it. They assert that the report was not 
probative of a breach of duty owed by 
Prudential, CW, or Dover, or of any notice 
they may have had that the elevator would 
mislevel. We agree. 
The report was prepared nine months 
after the incident and is, therefore, not 
probative of notice or a breach of duty. 
The report is not a "subsequent remedial 
measure" because it is not a change in 
Appellees' conduct. Thus, the report doet 
not define the standard of care. See 6 
Lynn McLain, Maryland Practice § 407.1 
(1987 & Supp.1992). 
Also, the proffered evidence is cumula-
tive to Moynihan's testimony. Moynihan 
testified that the spare parts maintained in 
the elevator control room were inadequate 
for preventive maintenance. Further, Moy: 
nihan testified that CW's failure to keep 
the call back and repair order records was 
a poor management technique and prevent-
ed them from recognizing the repetitive 
nature of the problem. The trial court 
"may exclude evidence deemed to be cumu-
lative." Lomax, 88 Md.App. at 54, 591 
A.2d 1311. Accordingly, the trial court's 
decision to exclude the report was not 
"manifestly wrong and substantially injuri-
ous." 
(B) 
Post-Accident Misleveling Incidents 
\2) Swann contends that the trial court 
precluded him from introducing evidence of 
misleveling incidents that occurred immedi-
ately after the February 2nd incident 
Swann argues that subsequent misleveling 
incidents were relevant and material facta 
necessary to give the jury a perspective 
that demonstrates that Bothell, Dover's re-
pairman, did not correct the problem with 
the elevator on the occasions prior to the 
incident. Swann maintains that this ruling 
prohibited him from fully developing his 
theory of negligence. We disagree. 
During a pre-trial hearing on a motion in 
limine, Swann argued that the post-inci-
dent occurrences were probative of the is* 
Cite as 620 A.2d 9 
sues of notice and Appellees' ability to cor-
rect the misleveling problem. To support 
his position, Swann relied on Hagan t\ 
Wash ington Subu rba n Sanita ry 
Comm'n, 20 Md.App. 192, 314 A.2d 699 
(1974), and cases cited therein, and in his 
brief cites Wilson, 317 Md. 284, 563 A.2d 
392. Swann's reliance is misplaced. These 
cases involve situations where the plaintiff 
attempted to introduce evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures, or changes in 
subsequent practices, not evidence of simi-
lar post-incident occurrences. In Wilson, 
for example, the Court of Appeals held that 
a change in patient monitoring policies 
made after a patient was injured as the 
result of a fall from a wheelchair was 
"admissible as evidence of the standard of 
care required under the circumstances," al-
though inadmissible as an ^admission of 
negligence or culpability." 317 Md. at 301, 
563 A.2d 392 (emphasis in original). 
It is clear that the subsequent incidents 
were not "subsequent remedial measures," 
which based on Maryland law are admissi-
ble under limited circumstances. It was 
undisputed that the elevator misleveled on 
February 2nd. Evidence of mislevelings 
after the incident was irrelevant and would 
have been unduly prejudicial. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion. 
(C) 
Corporate Officials' Deposition Testimony 
[3] The trial court refused to admit into 
evidence the deposition testimony of four 
Dover officials. Swann contends that the 
deposition testimony was relevant and ma-
terial because it established: 1) there were 
numerous misleveling incidents nationwide 
greater than the one to two inches Bothell 
claimed was the maximum extent the eleva-
tor could mislevel; 2) Dover knew of the 
large number of misleveling accidents on 
similar elevators and was on notice of this 
type of problem; 3) Dover had a preventa-
tive maintenance checklist for use by me-
chanics; 4) Dover had a document retention 
policy; 5) the frequency and percentages of 
tripping accidents caused by misleveling 
accidents prior to February 2, 1987; and, 6) 
Dover knew of the existence of a substan-
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tial number of misleveling problems in its 
elevators and was on notice of the magni-
tude of the problem prior to February 2, 
1987. 
Appellees argue that since Count II, the 
product liability count, was dismissed, the 
only remaining count was negligent eleva-
tor maintenance and repair, and therefore, 
much of the evidence Swann attempted to 
introduce was irrelevant. Appellees main-
tain that evidence of nationwide claims may 
have been relevant to Count 11, but had no 
relevance as to whether they had notice of 
misleveling resulting from the improper 
maintenance or repair of elevator number 
two. Accordingly, the evidence would have 
confused the jury and prejudiced Appellees. 
As to the use of the exhibits during cross-
examination of Bothell, Appellees contend 
that the court simply refused to allow 
cross examination of Bothell on issues in-
volving elevators that were not serviced by 
him or of which he had no personal knowl-
edge. Appellees explain that all other ex-
cluded evidence was cumulative to the tes-
timony of other witnesses. 
We perceive no reversible error. Dover's 
document retention policy was admitted 
into evidence during Swann's direct exami-
nation of Moynihan. Furthermore, Bothell 
testified that Dover had a preventive main-
tenance checklist. Thus, the deposition tes-
timony regarding Dover's document reten-
tion policy and preventive maintenance 
checklist was cumulative and its exclusion 
was harmless. 
I l l The deposition testimony indicating 
that Dover knew of misleveling problems in 
other elevators is not material to this case 
since Count II was dismissed. Other eleva-
tors could have had mechanical problems 
while elevator number two was operational 
Conversely, elevator number two coul( 
have had mechanical problems while othei 
elevators, nationwide, were operational 
The jury could not make any rational infer 
ence regarding the alleged negligent repai 
and maintenance of elevator number twi 
from the proffered deposition testimony 
Accordingly, the trial court did not abus 
its discretion. See McLain, supra 
§§ 401.1, 402.1. 
Swann attempted to impeach Bothell's 
testimony by introducing deposition testi-
mony of misleveling incidents greater than 
the one to two inches he claimed was the 
maximum extent the elevator could mislev-
el. As discussed in Section 11(C), infra, 
Bothell testified as a fact witness to his 
observations concerning elevator number 
two. The trial court, by excluding evidence 
of misleveling incidents that Bothell did not 
observe, properly limited cross-examination 
to Bothell's experience with elevator num-
ber two. 
II 
Swann next contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion by admitting testimo-
ny and other evidence otherwise inadmissi-
ble under Maryland law. 
(A) 
Evidence of Collateral Source Payments 
[5] Swann argues that the court erred 
by allowing questions regarding Swann's 
receipt of workers' compensation and 
IBM's medical disability plan payments. 
Swann maintains that the evidence was be-
ing used in an attempt to reduce Appellees' 
liability by showing that Swann continued 
to receive income after the incident. 
Swann contends that the collateral source 
rule allows admission of collateral source 
payments only if there is a preliminary 
showing of malingering or exaggeration of 
injury and that there was no evidence sup-
porting malingering or exaggeration sub 
judice. 
In Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 42 
Md.App. 291, 400 A.2d 440 (1979), a/fd, 287 
Md. 223, 411 A.2d 449 (1980), we were 
faced with a near identical situation. In 
that case, the trial court denied the plain-
tiffs' motion in limine in which they re-
quested that the trial court restrict the 
defendants "from mentioning social securi-
ty disability benefits being paid to the 
[plaintiff] since they were funds paid . . . 
from a collateral source and the [defen-
dant] was entitled to no credit in determin-
ing the jury's assessment of damages be-
cause of such collateral funds." Id. at 295, 
400 A.2d 440. We turned to Lcizear v. 
Butler, 226 Md. 171, 172 A.2d 518 (1961), in 
which the Court of Appeals 
noted with approval that the evidence of 
collateral payments is admissible if there 
is evidence in the case of malingering or 
exaggeration of injury but evidence as to 
collateral payments is inadmissible in the 
absence of evidence of malingering or 
exaggeration or where the real purpose 
of the evidence offered as to collateral 
sources is the mitigation of liability for 
damages of the defendant. 
Kelch, 42 Md.App. at 296, 400 A.2d 440 
(citations omitted). We held that the defen-
dant 
raised the issue of exaggeration of the 
plaintiff's injuries by the [defendant*'] 
cross-examination of the attending physi-
cian during which the physician conceded 
that there was, at least, a suggestion 
that the [plaintiff] was unwilling to work 
to seek employment possibly because the 
social security benefits the [plaintiff] re-
ceived were greater than he might hive 
earned if he were employed. 
Id. at 296-97, 400 A.2d 440. 
In the case sub judice, the Appellees 
made clear during the pre-trial hearing on 
the motion in limine that the evidence was 
to be introduced solely to show Swann's 
motivation for not returning to work. Dur* 
ing the trial, there was, "at least, a sugges-
tion" of malingering and exaggeration. 
For example, Swann's job at IBM was sed-
entary in nature. Medical experts testified 
that Swann was capable of sedentary work. 
There was also evidence that there was "no 
psychiatric disability that would keep 
[Swann] from working, and little in the 
way of physical." A vocational rehabilita-
tion consultant testified that he saw no 
reason why Swann could not be in the work 
force. Furthermore, one of Swann's own 
treating physicians said that he "[couW] 
get on with his life." Swann testified that 
he never tried to get another job. In 1989, 
Swann was able to drive a car for long 
periods of time and cut his lawn. In 1990, 
he worked out at a gym three times a 
week, two hours each time, for three 
months. At the time of trial, Swann did his 
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own laundry and dishes, and bought his 
own groceries. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court 
properly instructed the jury as follows: 
Now, whenever evidence has been ad-
mitted for one purpose you should not 
consider it for any other purpose. If you 
decide that the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover lost earnings you are not to use 
any evidence of payment received by the 
plaintiff for sick leave or disability pay-
ments or workman's compensation. 
Evidence of those payments have been 
admitted in this case for purposes other 
than the calculation of lost earnings such 
as it bears on the plaintiff's motivation to 
work. 
Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence 
of malingering and exaggeration, and 
Swann failed to establish that "the real 
purpose of the evidence offered as to collat-
eral sources [was] the mitigation of liability 
for damages...." Id. at 296, 400 A.2d 
440. Accordingly, we hold that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it 
admitted evidence of collateral source pay-
ments. 
(B) 
Late Disclosure of Expert Witnesses 
[6] Swann argues that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to exclude the testimony of improp-
erly disclosed expert witnesses. He con-
tends that Appellees were asked in inter-
rogatories, on May 2, 1989, to identify ex-
pert witnesses expected to be called at tri-
al, but, at the time, did not respond to the 
question. In a letter dated December 4, 
1991, CW and Prudential first identified 
experts they intended to call at trial. The 
experts were also identified in CW and 
Prudential's calendar call statement filed 
December 19, 1991, in Dover's calendar call 
statement filed December 26, 1991, and in 
CW's and Prudential's answers to interrog-
atories received by Swann on December 31, 
1991. 
Swann filed a motion to exclude the testi-
mony of Appellees' experts, which the trial 
court denied on January 3, 1992. Swann 
argues: 1) "Appellees waited until the eve 
of trial which was scheduled for January 6 
1992 to disclose the experts hoping thai 
this 'eleventh hour' tactic would interfere 
with [Swann's] counsel's trial preparation" 
and, 2) violated the trial court's order foi 
pre-trial procedures which provided that all 
discovery be completed within 15 days ol 
the Calendar Call (scheduled for December 
26, 1991). 
Appellees maintain that the trial court 
correctly admitted testimony of their ex-
perts because Swann was notified of the 
identity of the experts, albeit informally, on 
December 4, 1991. Appellees explain that 
the notification w;is informal in keeping 
with the procedurally informal tone of the 
case, and that Swann deposed each of the 
experts prior to trial; therefore, Swann 
was not prejudiced by any violations of 
discovery rules or the trial court's pre-trial 
order. We agree. 
One of the fundamental and principal 
[sic] objectives of the discovery rules is 
to require disclosure of facts by a party 
litigant to all of his adversaries, and 
thereby to eliminate, as far as possible, 
the necessity of any party to litigation 
going to trial in a confused or muddled 
state of mind, concerning the facts that 
give rise to the litigation. 
Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 55, 395 A.2d 
126 (1978); see a /so Hadid v. Alexander, 
55 Md.App. 344, 351, 462 A.2d 1216 (1983). 
" 'A trial judge is vested with a large mea-
sure of discretion in applying sanctions for 
failure to adhere to the discovery rules.' " 
Snyder r. Snyder, 79 Md.App. 448, 461, 
558 A.2d 412 (quoting Starfish Condomin-
ium Assoc, v. York ridge Sen\ Corj)., 295 
Md. 693, 712, 458 A.2d 805 (1983)), cert, 
denied. 317 Md. 511, 564 A 2d 1182 (1989). 
Although Appellees technically violated dis-
covery rules and the court's pre-trial order, 
Swann was not prejudiced. Swann had an 
opportunity to, and did in fact, depose the 
experts prior to trial. Appellees' conduct 
may have made trial preparation more dif-
ficult, but they did not hamper Swann's 
efforts. Thus, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion under the circumstances sub 
judice. We do not in any way intend to 
give the impression that we approve of 
Appellees' actions. Counsel should comply 
with discovery schedules, and when violat-
ed, sanctions may be imposed. 
(C) 
Opinions of Non-Expert Witnesses 
Swann also contends that the trial court 
erred by allowing opinion testimony of 
three lay witnesses whose testimony was 
offered to rebut Moynihan's expert testi-
mony. According to Swann, Berman, CW's 
property manager, testified that: 1) there 
had been an evolution in the field of proper-
ty management in the use of consultants; 
2) as of February 2, 1987, no elevator con-
sultant had criticized the maintenance and 
care being provided to the elevators located 
in Prudential's building; 3) Prudential and 
CW delegated all of the responsibility for 
the care of the elevators to Dover; 4) she 
was satisfied with Dover's performance in 
maintaining these elevators; and, 5) Appel-
lees did not breach a duty of care owed in 
the maintenance of the elevators. 
Furthermore, Swann alleges that Geist, 
CW's building engineer, rendered improper 
expert testimony when he: 1) stated that 
no elevator consultant ever criticized the 
maintenance Appellees provided before the 
incident; 2) opined that the maintenance 
records and spare parts were not neces-
sary; 3) testified regarding the frequency 
and the nature of the elevator misleveling 
problem; and, 4) stated his opinion that if a 
problem existed, he would have known 
about it. 
Swann also complains that Bothell gave 
expert opinion testimony that the accident 
could not have happened in the way de-
scribed by Swann and Donovan, including 
an analysis of the operation of the number 
14 contact and its effect upon the operation 
of the elevator. 
In short, Swann alleges that, because 
Appellees neither identified Berman, Geist, 
or Bothell as experts during discovery, nor 
qualified each as an expert at trial, the trial 
court abused its discretion by allowing the 
witnesses' testimony over objection. We 
disagree. 
"A lay witness may testify and give an 
opinion on matters as to which he or she 
has first-hand knowledge." Waddell v. 
State, 85 Md.App. 54, 66, 582 A.2d 260 
(1990). "Whether to allow such testimony 
lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." Yeagy v. State, 63 Md.App. 1, 22, 
491 A.2d 1199 (1985). Furthermore, "any 
nonexpert may testify to facts coming un-
der his observation, even though the facts 
are such as are provable ordinarily by ex-
perts." Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666, 
669, 57 A.2d 313 (1948). Of course, in 
order to preserve for appellate review the 
issue of the admission of "opinion" testimo-
ny, the complaining party must make a 
timely objection. "An objection to the ad-
mission of evidence shall be made at the 
time the evidence is offered or as soon 
thereafter as the grounds for objection be-
come apparent. Otherwise, the objection is 
waived." Rule 2-517(a). "When a party 
has the option of objecting, his failure to do 
so is regarded as a waiver estopping him 
from obtaining review of that point on ap-
peal." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 
76 Md.App. 709, 719, 548 A.2d 151 (1988). 
[71 First, Swann failed to object to Ber-
man's testimony concerning the use of ele-
vator consultants and CW's delegation to 
Dover of responsibility for the elevator's 
maintenance. Thus, we will not address 
Swann's contentions. See Bragg, 76 Md. 
App. at 719, 548 A.2d 151. Second, Ber-
man's testimony was not in response to a 
question calling for expert testimony. CW 
and Prudential asked Berman the following 
question: 
Can you tell us as of February 2, 1987 
and before whether or not anyone—when 
I say anyone I mean an elevator consul-
tant, an official from the State of Mary-
land, some government agency or what-
ever—has ever proposed or recom-
mended to you that [CW] keep and main-
tain records of complaints and elevator 
maintenance work for themselves? 
The question merely asked whether Ber-
man, based upon her experience as CW's 
property manager, had ever been advised 
by a consultant or state official regarding 
inadequate record-keeping. Swann argues 
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that by testifying that CW had never been 
told that they were acting improperly, Ber-
man, in essence, testified that Appellees did 
not breach a duty of care owed in the 
maintenance of the elevators. The jury 
might have inferred from Berman's testi-
mony that Appellees did not breach its duty 
of care; however, Berman did not so testi-
fy. 
[8] Geist was asked whether "in your 
experience not only with [CW] but at any 
point in time since 1959 has anyone ever 
recommended or suggested or proposed to 
you that you should keep and maintain 
records of an elevator company relating to 
any call backs, complaints and the mainte-
nance of that elevator?" For the same 
reasons as discussed supra, this was a 
proper question for a lay witness. More-
over, Swann argues that Geist offered an 
opinion that the maintenance records and 
spare parts were not necessary, but we are 
unable to find support for this assertion in 
the record. Swann directs us to pages 
841-43 of the record extract. The only 
question preserved for our review on those 
pages is the question addressed, supra. 
We have carefully reviewed the remaining 
portion of Geist's testimony and are unable 
to find what Swann says is there. 
[9] Swann next complains that "Geist 
was permitted, over objection, to testify 
about the frequency and the nature of the 
elevator misleveling problems." The only 
objection Swann made which appears in the 
record was to the form of the question, not 
to the fact the question called for improper 
expert testimony. Accordingly, the issue is 
not preserved for our review. See Great 
Coastal Express, Inc. v. Schruefer, 34 Md. 
App. 706, 724, 369 A.2d 118 ("if counsel 
volunteers his grounds at the time of the 
objection, he is bound on appeal to the 
grounds expressed"), cert, denied, 280 Md. 
730 (1977). 
[10] Geist also testified that if a prob-
lem existed with the elevator, he would 
have known about it. Swann asserts that 
the question called for expert opinion testi-
mony. Although Geist gave his "opinion" 
in the technical sense of the word, the 
opinion was based on first-hand knowledge 
and was not of the sort typically given by 
an expert. 
Swann also complains that Bothell "testi-
fied in explicit detail about the operation of 
the number 14 contact and its effect upon 
the operation of the elevator" and that this 
was opinion testimony reserved for an ex-
pert. Again, we shall not address Swann's 
contention because Swann did not object to 
this line of questioning. See Bragg, 76 
Md.App. at 719, 548 A.2d 151. 
[Ill Swann did, however, preserve for 
review the question whether the trial court 
erred in admitting Bothell's testimony that 
the accident could not have occurred in the 
way it was described by Swann and Dono-
van. Bothell testified: 
Q How much of a—. Basically be-
cause of the mechanism, the clutch that 
you are talking about, is there a point 
can there be a misleveling? 
A Yes, there could be. 
Q How much of a misleveling could 
there be? 
MR. FISHBEIN: Objection, Youi 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Misleveling t< 
what? 
I mean, what are you— 
BY MR. QUINN: 
Q At the floor where the elevator 
the car would stop either above or belov 
a floor. Can that happen? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And is there based upon—. T( 
what extent could that he? Could it b< 
five inches, ten inches, one inch, wha 
could it be? 
MR. FISHBEIN: Objection, You 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A I can only say one inch becaus 
that is all I hare ever seen. 
Q And the one inch would be what 
could it be above or below? 
A ft could be either way. 
Q Now, what you have just—. Agaii 
what you have stated, is that the cii 
en instances that yon have observe 
during the time that you have been 
servicing the elevator at [Prudential's 
building ]? 
A Yes, to all four [elevators]. Yes, 
sir. 
(Emphasis added). It is clear from Bot-
hell's testimony that his opinion was based 
solely on his observations of, and experi-
ence with, the elevators in Prudential's 
building. During cross-examination the 
following exchange took place: 
Q Now, sir, you have expressed the 
opinion today that an elevator cannot 
mislevel by more than an inch or two, is 
that correct? 
A I said I have never seen one. 
We are satisfied that Bothell did not render 
an expert opinion. He simply stated that 
he never observed Prudential's elevators 
mislevel by more that an inch or two. See 
Galusca, 189 Md. at 669, 57 A.2d 313. 
Thus, the trial court properly allowed the 
testimony since it was based on Bothell's 
first-hand knowledge. 
(D) 
Race Discrimination Suit 
[12 J Swann argues the trial court erred 
by allowing Appellees to ask Swann wheth-
er he was a party to a lawsuit against IBM. 
Swann contends the lawsuit, in which he 
alleged racial discrimination, played no part 
in the decision of Mr. Yingling, Swann's 
supervisor, or Dr. Corey, IBM's medical 
advisor, to recommend that Swann be 
placed on medical disability. Therefore, 
Swann maintains the suit was not relevant 
to the issues in the case. Swann adds that 
the two supervisors who made the decision 
to recommend Swann for medical disability 
testified that they did not know of the 
discrimination suit until the eve of the trial 
sub judice. 
Appellees contend the evidence was rele-
vant to Swann's credibility, and therefore 
admissible. According to Appellees, 
Swann's theory of the case included the 
fact that he was permanently disabled, and 
retired from IBM on a medical disability as 
a result of the elevator incident. Appellees 
maintain: 1) that Swann was a disgruntled 
employee who was being harassed by his 
supervisor; 2) that, contrary to his testimo-
ny, he would not have remained at IBM 
until retirement age of 65; 3) that he was 
not motivated to return to work; and, 4) 
that IBM was motivated to grant him medi-
cal disability. Thus, Appellees argue the 
evidence was relevant to Swann's credibili-
ty, as well as to the theory that he received 
the medical disability for reasons other 
than the elevator incident. We agree. 
Ill 
[13] Swann next contends that the trial 
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury 
on several theories. A party is generally 
entitled to have its theory of the case pre-
sented to the jury if two conditions are 
satisfied: "(1) the instruction . . . correctly 
state[s] the law, and (2) that law [is] appli-
cable in light of the evidence before the 
jury." Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 
186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979). If these 
conditions are met, and the trial court ne-
vertheless refuses to instruct the jury, the 
court errs as a matter of law. See id. at 
204, 401 A.2d 651. 
(A) 
Res Ipsa Loquitur 
" The difficulties arising from the barrel 
of flour which rolled out of a warehouse 
window in 1863 and into the lives of tort 
lawyers,' compounded by Baron Pollock's 
casual statement (' "res ipsa loquitur" *) 
during argument of the case Byrne v. Boa-
die, 159 Eng.Rep. 299 (1863) are still with 
us today." Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 
Md. 37, 38-39, 273 A.2d 412 (1971). Swann 
argues that the trial court erred when it 
refused to instruct the jury on res ipsa 
loquitur. 
Appellees do not contend Swann's re-
quested instruction does not correctly state 
the law. In fact, Swann's proposed in-
struction was based on Maryland Civil Pat-
tern Jury Instruction 19:5. See MICPEU 
Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions 446 (1984). Appellees argue the sec-
ond prong of Pickett's two-part test was 
not satisfied, i.e., there was insufficient 
Cite a* 620 A.2d < 
evidence before the jury to warrant a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction. We disagree. 
We note preliminarily that both Swann 
and Appellees arc apparently under the 
impression that the proposed res ipsa lo-
quitur instruction was applicable to Pru-
dential, CW, and Dover. The record clear-
ly indicates, however, that the proposed 
instruction only made reference to Dover. 
It did not mention Prudential or CW. Ac-
cordingly, we shall consider only whether 
the trial court erred by refusing to instruct 
the jury on res ipsa loquitur with respect 
to Dover's liability. 
The law concerning the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur was reviewed at length in 
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. 
Hicks, 25 Md.App. 503, 337 A.2d 744, cert 
denied, 275 Md. 750 (1975). In Hicks, we 
recounted the evolution of what is now a 
three-part test to determine the doctrine's 
applicability. In order to invoke the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff 
must establish: 
"1. A casualty of a sort which usually 
does not occur in the absence of 
negligence. 
2. Caused by an instrumentality within 
the defendant's exclusive control. 
3. Under circumstances indicating that 
the casualty did not result from the 
act or omission of the plaintiff." 
Hicks, 25 Md.App. at 516, 337 A.2d 744 
{quoting Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling 
Co., 261 Md. 541, 547-48, 276 A.2d 81 
(1971)); see also Giant Food, Inc. v. Wash-
ington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 
592, 597, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Ramsey v. 
D.P.A. Assocs., 265 Md. 319, 325, 289 A.2d 
321 (1972); Harris v. Otis Elevator Co., 92 
Md.App. 49, 52, 606 A.2d 305 (1992). Once 
the tripartite test is met, 
[t]he doctrine . . . provides a permissible 
inference of negligence. This means 
that the inference of negligence to be 
drawn from the circumstances is left to 
the jury. They are permitted, but not 
compelled to find it. As for the plaintiff, 
the doctrine furnishes sufficient evidence 
to go to the trier of fact. As for the 
defendant, the burden of proof is not 
shifted to him, nor is any burden of 
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introducing evidence cast upon him, ex-
cept in (he very limited sense that if he 
fails to do so, lie runs the risk that the 
trier of fact may . . . find against him. 
Hicks, 25 Md.App. at 529-30, 337 A.2d 744. 
Appellees cite Flench v. Woodward & 
Lothrop, Inc., 18 Md.App. 645, 308 A.2d 
439 (1973), for the proposition that a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction must only be giv-
en after the plaintiff proves each of the 
three elements by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Beach, however, does not sup-
port Appellees' formulation of the law. 
[Ml The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 3281) (1964) provides in pertinent part: 
(2) It is the function of the court to de-
termine whether the inference may rea-
sonably he drawn by the jury, or whether 
it must necessarily be drawn. 
(3) It is the function of the jury to deter-
mine whether the inference is to be 
drawn in any case where different con-
clusions may reasonably be reached. 
Comment e to § 3281) adds: 
It is enough that the facts proved reason-
ably permit the conclusion that negli-
gence is the more probable explanation. 
This conclusion is not for the court to 
draw, or to refuse to draw, in any case 
where either conclusion is reasonable; 
and even though the court would not 
itself find negligence, it must still leave 
the question to the jury if reasonable 
men might do so. 
(Emphasis added). Accordingly, the triall 
court must instruct the jury on res ipsal 
loquitur if it believes the jury, after con-l 
sidering the evidence, or making rational! 
inferences therefrom, could reasonably] 
find that the plaintiff proved each element! 
I by a preponderance of the evidence. See\ 
Fields v. Morgan, 39 Md.App. 82, 83, 382 
A.2d 1099 (1978) (discussed in Section 
111(A)(3), infra ); Hunch 18 MH Apn^at 
649-50. 308 A.2d 139 ({Whether a'Turvl 
would accept appellant's testimony as cred-
ible . . . is a question for the jury, not the] 
lyourts. to decide."). • I 
115.1 Before we turn to each of the 
three elements, it is important to address 
first an issue not raised by the parties. At 
trial, Swann introduced specific evidence of 
Dover's (i.e., Bothell's) negligence: 1) its 
failure to replace the 14 and 15 contacts; 2) 
its failure to spend adequate time maintain-
ing the elevator; 3) its failure to stock an 
adequate supply of spare parts in Pruden-
tial's building; and, 4) its failure to use a 
preventive maintenance checklist. This 
raises the question of whether a plaintiff, 
who makes out a prima facie case of negli-
gence based on evidence of specific acts of 
negligence, may rely on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur and have the jury instructed 
on both negligence and res ipsa loquitur. 
In earlier cases, the Court of Appeals 
held that "if there is direct evidence of 
negligence, and all the facts causing the 
injury are known and testified to by wit-
nesses at the trial," Frenkil v. Johnson, 
175 Md. 592, 605, 3 A.2d 479 (1939), "there 
is no basis for the application of [res ipsa 
loquitur]," Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 111 
Md. 393, 411, 9 A.2d 572 (1939). See also 
Smith v. Baltimore Transit Co., 214 Md. 
560, 566, 136 A.2d 386 (1957), and cases 
cited therein; Recent Decision, Torts—Res 
Ipsa Loquitur Not Available To Plaintiff 
Who Attempts to Prove Specific Acts of 
Negligence, 22 Md.L.Rev. 174 (1962). 
For example, in Smith v. Bemfeld, 226 
Md. 400, 174 A.2d 53 (1961), the plaintiffs 
brought suit for personal injuries and medi-
cal expenses incurred as the result of a fall 
from a beauty salon chair. The plaintiffs 
attempted to establish defendant's negli-
gence by offering evidence to indicate that 
the chair was defectively constructed, and 
that defendant's employees knew of its de-
fective nature, yet failed to bolt the chair 
to the floor or provide another type of chair 
which would not tip over. Chief Judge 
Brune, speaking for the Court of Appeals, 
stated: 
[W]e think that the plaintiffs' attempt to 
establish specific grounds of alleged neg-
ligence precludes recourse to the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. Smith v. 
Baltimore Transit Co., 214 Md. 560, 566, 
136 A.2d 386; Maszczenski v. Myers, 212 
Md. 346, 352, 129 A.2d 109; Coastal 
Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137, 145, 
106 A.2d 98, Hickory Transfer Co. v. 
Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 262-263, 96 A.2d 
241; Strasburger v. Vogel, 103 Md. 85, 
63 A. 202, We accordingly hold that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not avail-
able to the plaintiffs here. 
Id. 226 Md. at 409, 174 A.2d 53. Seven 
months later, however, Chief Judge Brune 
qualified the Court's holding in Smith. 
[I]t seems desirable to point out a limita-
tion upon the scope of [the Smith ] opin-
ion. In that case all of the facts with 
regard to the actual happening of the 
accident had been developed, and when 
developed, they were held insufficient to 
establish negligence on the part of the 
defendant. It was in that context that 
we said . . . that "the plaintiffs' attempt 
to establish specific grounds of alleged 
negligence precludes recourse to the doe-
trine of res ipsa loquitur." Each of the 
cases cited in support of this statement 
was a case in which the facts had been 
similarly disclosed; and the plaintiffs 
difficulty was that the evidence did not 
stop at the point of showing the happen-
ing of the accident under circumstances 
in which negligence of the defendant was 
a permissible inference . . . , but went fur-
ther and showed how the accident hap-
pened and so removed the basis for in-
voking the doctrine 
On the facts of Smith v. Bemfeld, 
supra, there was no occasion to extend 
the rule further than the holdings of the 
cases cited; and to avoid possible misun-
derstanding, we now state that the quot-
ed comment was not intended to and 
should not be treated as extending the 
rule of those cases. We adhere to the 
rule as stated by Judge Hammond in the 
Coastal Tank Lines case: "We think 
that 'the facts and the demands of jus-
tice' do not require that an inference be 
permitted to be drawn as a matter of 
right where all of the circumstances of 
the occurrence are shown by the testimo-
ny." 
Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 532-38, 
180 A.2d 677 (1962) (citations omitted). If 
any confusion remained after Jacobs, a la* 
ter case, Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 
37, 273 A.2d 412 (1971), made clear that an 
attempt to prove specific acts of negligence 
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does not necessarily preclude reliance on 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
In Blankenship, the plaintiff, a delivery 
man, sustained personal injuries while mov-
ing a refrigerator into defendant's home. 
Plaintiff and his co-worker were "bringing 
[the refrigerator] into the house via the 
rear steps and a porch which had been built 
by the [defendant]." Id. at 39, 273 A.2d 
412. Plaintiff's co-worker fell through one 
of the steps, and plaintiff "therefore had to 
hold the refrigerator from above in order 
to keep it from falling on his co-worker." 
Id. at 40, 273 A.2d 412. As a result, plain-
tiff injured his back. 
At trial, plaintiff "was somewhat intimi-
dated by Judge Sobeloff's comment in 
Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md. 
253, 263, 96 A.2d 241 (1953), that 'Paradoxi-
cally, the plaintiffs proved too much and 
too little.' Fearful of proving 'too much' 
he called only the defendant property own-
er . . . and the plaintiff...." Id. 261 Md. 
at 39, 273 A.2d 412 (footnote omitted). 
Plaintiff then rested his case, relying on 
res ipsa loquitur, and the trial court grant-
ed defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict. 
On appeal, the Court held that this was a 
proper case for submission to the jury on 
res ipsa loquitur, and stated that plaintiff 
"might properly have attempted to prove 
more than he did without weakening his 
reliance on res ipsa loquitur." Id. at 45, 
273 A.2d 412. The Court then embarked 
on a discussion of its earlier cases, includ-
ing Smith and Jacobs. 
Early in this Court's consideration of 
res ipsa loquitur we held that when a 
plaintiff relies on the doctrine and its 
attendant inferences, it must not appear 
from the plaintiffs own evidence that 
something other than the defendant's 
negligence caused the accident. This 
concept was logically extended so that 
"where all the facts and circumstances 
are shown by testimony," whether it was 
introduced by plaintiff or defendant, and 
that evidence shows that the injury 
might have been caused by something 
other than the defendant's negligence, 
res ipsa loquitur would not apply, be-
llUCl./ipp. 1773 / 
cause there would no longer be any need 
for relying on an inference. In Smith v. 
Bemfeld, Chief Judge Brune, speaking 
for the Court, stated that the attempt by 
the plaintiffs in that case to prove specif-
ic grounds of negligence precluded their 
relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur. However, in Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 
an opinion also written by Chief Judge 
Brune only 7 months after Smith v. 
Bemfeld, he explained that the attempts 
by the plaintiffs in Smith to establish 
specific grounds of negligence had pre-
cluded their relying on res ipsa loquitur 
only because they had proved all of the 
farts regarding the accident and were 
unable to show that the defendant's neg-
ligence caused the injury. He specifical-
ly disavowed any intention in Smith of 
extending the rule of the earlier 
cases.. . . 
If the plaintiff has circumstantial evi-
dence which tends to show the defen-
dant's negligence (and which is therefore 
consistent with the inference relied upon 
in res ipsa loquitur) he should not as a 
matter of policy be disrou raged from 
coming forth with it. If, however, the 
evidence introduced by the plaintiff or 
the defendant shows that everything rel-
ative to the case is known, and that the 
injury might have been caused by some-
thing other than defendant's negligence 
(thereby negating the inference normally 
relied upon in res ipsa loquitur), then 
the plaintiff will not be allowed to avai 
himself of the doctrine. In such a case 
if plaintiffs proof fails to make out i 
prima facie case of negligence then it n 
proper to direct a verdict for the defen 
dant. 
Id. 261 Md. at 45-46, 273 A.2d 412 (cita 
tions omitted) (emphasis added in part). 
In light of Blankenship, it is clear tha 
Maryland is aligned with the majority o 
American jurisdictions which hold that "ai 
unsuccessful attempt to prove specific nef 
ligence on the defendant's part, or the ir 
troduction of evidence of specific negl 
gence not clearly establishing the precis 
cause of injury, will not deprive the plaii 
tiff of the benefits otherwise available ui 
der the doctrine (of res ipsa loquitur\ 
Annotation, Evidence of Specific Negli-
gence as Affecting Reliance on Res Ipsa 
Loquitur, 33 A.L.R.2d 791, 798 (1954). 
Therefore, 
where the evidence of specific negligence 
introduced does not purport to furnish a 
complete explanation of the occurrence, 
or where there is a dispute at the close of 
the evidence as to what the precise cause 
of the accident was, or where reasonable 
men might differ as to the effect of the 
evidence before the jury, the plaintiff is 
not required to prove the specific acts of 
negligence as alleged, but may rely upon 
the proof and its reasonable inferences to 
establish a prima facie case of general 
negligence. 
1 Stuart M. Speiser, Res Ipsa Loquitur 
§ 5:19, at 190 (1972). 
In the case subjudice, Swann attempted 
to prove that Dover negligently repaired 
elevator number two on January 7th by 
cleaning the number 14 and 15 contacts 
rather than replacing them. Swann also 
attempted to prove that Dover negligently 
maintained the elevator. Swann did not, 
however, purport to furnish a complete ex-
planation of the accident. Indeed, Swann 
offered evidence establishing that Dover 
responded to reports of mislevelings on two 
separate occasions following the January 
7th repair. There was no evidence of what, 
if any, corrective measures Dover took on 
those dates. It may well be that Dover 
negligently repaired the elevator on one, or 
both, of those occasions and such negligent 
act or acts caused the February 2nd mislev-
eling incident. Further, at the close of the 
evidence, there was a dispute as to what 
caused the accident. Bothell testified that 
it was proper to clean, rather than replace, 
the 14 and 15 contacts, and that the door 
clutch mechanism prevents the elevator 
doors from opening when the elevator cab 
is greater than an inch or two from floor 
level. Therefore, "reasonable men might 
[have] differfed] as to the effect of the 
evidence before the jury." See id. 
[E]ven though the jury could have prop-
erly found that the accident was caused 
by such a specific act of negligence, and 
was so instructed by the trial court, it 
has been held that the mere fact that the 
plaintiff seeks to bolster his case by spe-
cific evidence should not compel him to 
forgo reliance on res ipsa loquitur, or to 
elect between res ipsa and specific negli-
gence, unless the proof adduced by the 
plaintiff actually refutes or negates the 
inference which might otherwise be 
drawn from application of the doctrine. 
Id. § 5:20, at 193 (citation omitted). In this 
case, evidence that Dover negligently re-
paired and maintained elevator number two 
neither refutes nor negates the inference 
of negligence supplied by the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur. In fact, the evidence, if 
believed, supports and is consistent with an 
inference of negligence. 
The evidence of Dover's negligent repair 
and maintenance 
may merely support one of the many 
possible explanations of the accident, 
known or unknown. If the jury finds 
that it was the specifically proved act of 
negligence which occasioned the acci-
dent, that is the end of the matter. But, 
if the jury deems the specific evidence 
unconvincing, there is no reason whatev-
er why it may not infer that the remain-
ing possible causes, though they be un-
identified, still point to the negligence of 
the defendant. 
Id. at 194. In other words, specific proof 
may show just how the accident hap-
pened and this showing may preclude the 
likelihood of defendant's negligence or so 
reduce it as to leave an insufficient basis 
in probabilities for an inference of negli-
gence Short of this, the fact that a 
plaintiff offers specific proof should be 
given no more than its logically probative 
effect, and this may not eliminate some 
of the possible explanations of the occur-
rence [The evidence] may, if credit-
ed, lead to a finding of specific negli-
gence In that case[,] the doctrine of 
[res ipsa loquitur] is not needed. But if 
the proof of that explanation fails (ei-
ther because it is legally insufficient or 
because it is not credited), the mere fact 
that it was offered has no logical ten-
dency to eliminate other explanations 
involving . . . negligence ..., and then 
Cite M 620 A.2d 989 
is no sound basis for denying applica-
tion of the doctrine.... 
4 Fowler V. Harper, et al., The Law of 
Torts § 19.10, at 67-68 (2d ed. 1986) (em-
phasis added). 
Accordingly, we hold that Swann's at-
tempt to prove specific acts of negligence 
did not prevent him from requesting that 
the jury be instructed on both negligence 
and res ipsa loquitur. Our decision is 
consistent with Maryland law, see Blank-
enship, 261 Md. at 46, 273 A.2d 412; Un-
satisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. 
Bowles, 25 Md.App. 558, 564, 334 A.2d 532 
(1975) (res ipsa loquitur applied despite 
testimony of plaintiffs expert that defen-
dant automobile operator was intoxicated 
at the time his car ran off the road and 
struck plaintiff), and the law of other juris-
dictions, see, e.g., Domany v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 369 F.2d 604, 614 (6th Cir.1966) (apply-
ing Ohio law), cert, denied, 387 U.S. 942, 87 
S.Ct. 2073, 18 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1967); Coffey 
v. Brodsky, 165 Ill.App.3d 14, 116 Ill.Dec. 
16, 21-22, 518 N.E.2d 638, 643-44 (1987), 
cert, denied, 119 I11.2d 554, 119 Ill.Dec. 
383, 522 N.E.2d 1242 (1988); Abbott v. 
Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 502, 297 
N.Y.S.2d 713, 719-20, 245 N.E.2d 388, 393-
94 (1969); Burgess v. Otis Elevator Co., 
114 A.D.2d 784, 495 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 
(1985), affdf 69 N.Y.2d 623, 511 N.Y.S.2d 
227, 503 5l.E.2d 692 (1986); Weeden v. Ar-
mor Elevator Co., 97 A.D.2d 197, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 898, 901-02 (1983); see also Anno-
tation, Evidence of Specific Negligence as 
Affecting Reliance on Res Ipsa Loquitur, 
33 A.L.R.2d 791 (1954); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 328D, cmt. m (1963) ("The 
view which now tends to prevail is that res 
ipsa loquitur may still be applied, to the 
extent that the inference to be drawn sup-
ports the specific allegation or the specific 
proof "). 
As one court observed, rather than be-
ing penalized for going forward and 
making as specific a case of negligence 
as possible, a plaintiff entitled to the 
benefits of res ipsa loquitur should be 
encouraged to prove as much as possible, 
there being no reason why such proof 
should wholly dispel the inference any 
more than it would in any other case, 
(Md.App. 1993) 
since the end result is not injurious to the 
defendant. On the contrary, he is in a 
better position in so far as he has specific 
evidence to meet before the trier of fact 
that may be helpful to him, and the case 
should go to such trier with the genera 
inference of negligence plus other evi 
dence of specific facts to be weighec 
against the defendant's showing 
Speiser, supra, § 5:20, at 194-95. 
(1) 
[16] The first element in Hicks* three 
part test is whether Swann's "casualty 
[was] of a sort which usually does no 
occur in the absence of negligence." Ap 
pellees do not dispute that this criterioi 
was satisfied. We are likewise satisfie< 
that a reasonable jury could rationally infei 
that an elevator does not ordinarily mislev 
el in the absence of someone's negligence 
Svv Beach, 18 Md.App. at 649, 308 A.2d 43! 
("It is a rational inference that escalator 
do not ordinarily stop, then start up with i 
jerk, without negligence."); Bigio v. Oti 
Elevator Co., 175 A.l).2d 823, 573 N.Y.S.2< 
1%, 197 (1991) ("it was reasonable for th 
jury to conclude that the misleveling of th 
elevator was not the kind of event to occu 
in the absence of negligence"); Burgest 
495 N.Y.S.2d at 379 ("misleveling of eleva 
tor . . . was an event of a kind which woul 
not ordinarily occur in the absence of negl: 
gence"); Weedvn, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 904 ("ov 
ershooting and off-leveling" of elevato 
would not ordinarily occur had defendan 
exercised due care); see a/so Ruiz v. Oti 
Elevator, 146 Ariz. 98, 703 P.2d 1247, 125 
(Ct.App.1985) (whether an elevator ma 
function would ordinarily not occur abser 
someone's negligence is a jury question i 
borderline cases). Appellees, howevei 
take issue with the second and third eh 
ments of the Hicks test. 
(2) 
117] Appellees argue that Swann's a 
leged injuries were not "caused by an ii 
strumentality within the (Appellees'] excli 
sive control." Appellees contend the elev; 
tor was not within the exclusive control < 
Appellees because IHM was the only tenai 
in the building, and IBM was not named as 
a defendant. They reason that IBM, as 
sole tenant of the premises, shared control 
over the elevators which negates the ele-
ment of Appellees' exclusive control. In 
light of the fact that Swann only preserved 
the issue of whether a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction was appropriate as against Do-
ver, we do not consider whether Appellees 
had joint exclusive control over the eleva-
tor. We shall only address whether Dover 
had "exclusive control." 
We recently addressed the element of 
exclusive control in Harris v. Otis Eleva-
tor Co., 92 Md.App. 49, 606 A.2d 305 
(1992). In Harris, the plaintiff was injured 
when she alighted from an elevator which 
had misleveled three to six inches below 
floor level. At the time of the accident, the 
elevator was being used to carry passen-
gers. At other times, however, the eleva-
tor had been used to carry freight. The 
plaintiff testified that: 
"A: [Persons using the elevator for 
freight purposes] would load it, they 
would bang it against the top of the 
elevator, if they could not fit a piece into 
the elevator, they would shove it in. I 
have seen where doors have been jam-
med open, and tried to—the furniture 
being moved out, if they have not been 
able to get it around the corner, it—that 
is what I would interpret as being mis-
handled. 
Q: Did you see them putting things in 
front of the door so they would not shut, 
so they are kind of banging open and 
banging open? 
A: Yes." 
Id. at 54, 606 A.2d 305. The trial court 
granted the defendant's motion for judg-
ment because "the use and operation of the 
elevator by other tenants precluded a find-
ing that [the elevator repair company] pos-
sessed exclusive control of the elevator." 
Id. at 51, 606 A.2d 305. 
We held that the elevator repair company 
was not in exclusive control of the elevator. 
In doing so, we relied on Smith v. Kelly, 
246 Md. 640, 229 A.2d 79 (1967). In Smith, 
the plaintiff, a patron of defendant's laun-
dromat, was injured when a piece of a 
drum of an extractor broke off and was 
flung from the drum which contained a 
spinner basket revolving at 1750 r.p.m. 
The trial court directed a verdict for the 
defendants. After summarizing the condi-
tions required for the application of res 
ipsa loquitur, the Court of Appeals deter-
mined that it was not applicable to the 
facts of the case. The Court noted that 
The extractor located on appellees' prem-
ises was in constant use for various peri-
ods of time by members of the public 
who had exclusive possession and control 
over it while it was in use. The doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur is not available in 
the case since the machine was not in the 
sole control of appellees. 
Id. at 644, 229 A.2d 79; see also Ramsey, 
265 Md. at 326, 289 A.2d 321 (1972) ("A 
glass door through which occupants of an 
apartment house and their guests constant-
ly pass and repass is not under such exclu-
sive control of the landlord as to permit 
invocation of the res ipsa doctrine."), over-
ruled on other grounds by B & K Rentals 
and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco 
Co., 324 Md. 147, 596 A.2d 640 (1991); 
Dorsey v. General Elevator Co., 241 Md. 
99, 107, 215 A.2d 757 (1966) (elevator ser-
vice company did not have control of eleva-
tor because it was manually operated); 
Burkowske v. Church Hosp. Corp., 50 Md. 
App. 515, 523, 439 A.2d 40 (defendant hos-
pital did not have exclusive possession and 
control over a bench that collapsed for un-
known reasons), cert, denied, 293 Md. 331 
(1982). In Lee v. Housing Auth., 203 Md. 
453, 462, 101 A.2d 832 (1954), the Court of 
Appeals observed: 
The element of control has an important 
bearing as negativing the hypothesis of 
an intervening cause beyond the defen-
dant's control, and also as tending to 
show affirmatively that the cause was 
one within the power of the defendant to 
prevent by the exercise of care. Thus it 
has been held that the inference is not 
permissible where the plaintiffs' testimo-
ny tends to show an exculpatory cause, 
or where the lapse of time and the oppor* 
tunity for interference by others weak-
ens the probability that the injury is at-
Cite as 620 A.Zd 9 
tributable to the defendant's act or omis-
sion. 
(Citation omitted). 
In Harris, there was substantial evi-
dence that the elevator was subject to 
abuse and mishandling. Likewise in 
Smith, the washing machine was constant-
ly used, and perhaps abused, by patrons. 
In the case sub judice, however, the jury 
could have found that there was no such 
exculpatory cause and that others had no 
opportunity to interfere with the elevator's 
mechanical components. 
The logical basis for [the exclusive con-
trol] requirement is simply that it must 
appear that the negligence of which the 
thing speaks is probably that of defen-
dant and not of another. 
* * * * * * 
The fallacy of the "exclusive control" 
test is seen in many situations where the 
doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur ] is unhesi-
tatingly applied despite absence of "con-
trol." Where for instance the defen-
dant's duty of care with respect to the 
injuring agency is (as to the plaintiff) 
nondelegable, the fact that control may 
have been in an independent contractor 
will not preclude the application of the 
doctrine. And there are many situations 
where "it is clear that 'control' is simply 
the wrong word1." Where a fuse mis-
fires, or a bottle explodes, the inference 
of negligence may still point to the man-
ufacturer or bottler if the proof elimi-
nates the probability of other causes, 
even though the mishap occurs at a time 
and place remote from defendant's con-
trol. 
Harper, supra, § 19.7 (2d ed. 1986) (foot-
notes omitted); see also Leikach, 261 Md. 
at 548, 276 A.2d 81. 
The majority of states considering the 
exclusive control issue under facts similar 
to those sub judice have concluded that an 
elevator maintenance company is in exclu-
sive control of an elevator it services. In 
» 1 Md.App. IV¥JJ 
to five inches above floor level. The defen-
dant elevator company had a service con-
tract with the building owner "whereunder 
it was obligated to maintain the elevators 
in proper and safe operating condition, sys-
tematically inspect them, and repair any 
defective parts." Id. 495 N.Y.S.2d at 378. 
The trial court instructed the jury on negli-
gence and res ipsa loquitur, and the jury 
returned a plaintiff's verdict. Defendant 
appealed and challenged, in part, the pro-
priety of the res ipsa loquitur instruction. 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, held that the res ipsa loquitur 
instruction was appropriate given the fact 
that plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence of 
the three elements necessary to invoke the 
doctrine. The Court acknowledged that 
the second element, "exclusive control of 
the instrumentality, (was) shown, given 
[the building owner's) reliance upon defen-
dant's expertise to inspect and maintain the 
intricate devices of the elevator in reason-
ably safe operating condition, pursuant to 
the service agreement." Id. 495 N.Y.S.2d 
at 380. In doing so, the Court quoted a 
passage from an earlier case, Weeden v. 
Armor Elevator Co., 97 A.D.2d 197, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1983). 
" 'Exclusivity' is a relative term, not an 
absolute. 'The logical basis for [the con-
trol] requirement is simply that it must 
appear that the negligence of which the 
thing speaks is probably that of defen-
dant and not of another.' (2 Harper and 
James, IThe Law of Torts], § 19.7, p. 
1085." _ _ -
Burgess v. Otis Elevator Co., 114 A.D.2d 
784, 495 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1985), affd, 69 
N.Y.2d 623, 511 N.Y.S.2d 227, 503 N.E.2d 
692 (1986), the plaintiff tripped while exit-
ing an elevator that had misleveled by two 
495 N.Y.S.2d at 380 (alterations in original). 
In Weeden, the plaintiff was injured 
when an elevator in which she was riding 
" 'passed the third floor and went to the 
top ...[,] hit something ...[,] shook . . . , 
and went down to the third floor and . . . 
bounced back up again.' " 468 N.Y.S.2d at 
899. The plaintiff filed an action against 
the defendant elevator company, "the man-
ufacturer and sole maintenance company 
under contract with the [building owner] to 
service (the elevator)." Id. 468 N.Y.S.2d at 
900. The trial court refused to instruct the 
jury on res ipsa loquitur, and the jury 
returned a defendant's verdict. The appel-
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late court reversed. In addressing the ex-
clusive control element, the Court recog-
nized 
that all general maintenance and repair 
work on the operating mechanism of [the 
elevator] was performed solely by [defen-
dant] pursuant to its service contract 
with the [building owner]. The latter's 
"mechanical responsibilities" merely 
comprised the changing of fuses where 
necessary . . . , presumably, general 
housekeeping and cleaning of the visible 
interior and exterior portions of the cab, 
and the shutting off of power to any cab 
exhibiting a mechanical problem. In 
sum, the [building owner] relied upon 
[defendant], as an expert in elevator 
maintenance, to locate and remedy any 
defects, and in such capacity, [defendant] 
had exclusive control of the inspection 
and maintenance of [the elevator]. 
Id. 468 N.Y.S.2d at 904; see also Bigio, 573 
N.Y.S.2d at 197 (res ipsa loquitur instruc-
tion appropriate in an elevator misleveling 
accident). 
The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed 
the issue of exclusive control in American 
Elevator Co. v. Briscoe, 93 Nev. 665, 572 
P.2d 534 (1977). The Court in Briscoe held 
that an elevator maintenance company that 
had an exclusive contract to maintain and 
repair an elevator had exclusive control of 
the elevator. The Court found that the 
plaintiff 
presented facts to the jury which would 
indicate that some negligent maintenance 
had occurred. The . . . incident was not 
an isolated phenomenon. Evidence was 
adduced through several [building] em-
ployees which showed anomalies in the 
elevator's operation on many occasions 
prior to the . . . accident. 
* * * * * * 
To require a plaintiff to establish ex-
clusive control in the defendant with re-
spect to any possible cause of the acci-
dent before permitting the application of 
res ipsa loquitur would emasculate the 
doctrine. He was required, as was 
done, only to produce sufficient evidence 
from which it could be said that it was 
more likely than not that it was negli-
gence on the part of his adversary. 
Id. 572 P.2d at 537 (emphasis added in 
part). 
In addition to New York and Nevada, 
Florida and Pennsylvania appear to take a 
similar stand. See Commercial Union 
Ins. Co. v. Street, 327 So.2d 113 (Fla.Dist 
Ct.App.1976); Johnson v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 225 Pa.Super. 500, 311 A.2d 656 (1973). 
Other states have addressed the issue, but 
have concluded that a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction was inappropriate. The facts in 
those cases, however, can be distinguished 
from the facts sub judice. 
For example, in Bias v. Montgomery 
Elevator Co., 216 Kan. 341, 532 P.2d 1053 
(1975), a "falling elevator" case, the Su-
preme Court of Kansas held that the case 
was inappropriate for submission to the 
jury on res ipsa loquitur. The Court ob-
served that 
[t]he operation of the automatic elevator 
. . . involved highly complex electrical 
and mechanical equipment which was de-
signed, manufactured and installed by 
a company other than defendant. The 
responsibility of a maintenance company 
does not extend to manufacturing de-
fects, but is limited to liability for negli-
gence in the performance of its duties. 
The defendant company had no control 
over any design defects, mistakes in in-
stallation, or any possible faulty con-
struction of the elevator shaft. These 
are all possible causes of the accident 
which would not have been subject to the 
control of defendant. 
Id. 532 P.2d at 1057-58 (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). The Court of Appeals of 
Washington likewise concluded that the tri-
al court properly refused an instruction on 
res ipsa loquitur in Murphy v. Montgom-
ery Elevator Co., 65 Wash.App. 112, 828 
P.2d 584 (1992). In that case, the plaintiff 
was injured when the elevator she was 
stepping out of dropped two to four inches 
below floor level. The defendant elevator 
repair company was under contract to 
maintain and repair the elevator. The 
building owner's director of engineering, 
however, "periodically inspected the defen-
JWAfNnc v . r i u i u r , m i i / i h imr>. 
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dant's] work, look|ed] at the elevator and 
elevator rooms to insure they were in prop-
er order, and occasionally watch[ed the de-
fendant] service the elevators." Id. 828 
P.2d at 586. "[I]f a part needed replace-
ment [the repairman] would go to [the 
building owner] for authorization " Id. 
The Court reasoned that "[bjecause [the 
building owner] retained some control over 
the elevators, and because its contract with 
[defendant] was only a limited service con-
tract, [defendant] did not have exclusive 
control of the elevators." Id. 
Other states have considered the exclu-
sive control element in cases with facts 
materially different from those sub judice 
and have concluded that res ipsa loquitur 
was inapplicable. See, e.g., Stines v. Otis 
Elevator Co., 104 Ill.App.3d 608, 60 Ill.Dec. 
399, 401, 432 N.E.2d 1298, 1300 (1982) (no 
evidence that elevator repair company was 
in control of elevator at time of accident); 
Pedersen v. White-Evans Elevator Co., 
511 N.E.2d 460, 464 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (no 
evidence that defendant's negligence 
caused elevator "overshooting"; further-
more, there was evidence suggesting that 
the malfunction was caused by the lack of 
a proper amount of voltage to the eleva-
tor—the power supply was in the building 
owner's exclusive control, not the elevator 
repair company's); Hillas v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 120 N.J.Super. 105, 293 A.2d 
419, 424 (element of exclusive control ne-
gated where the elevator, although auto-
matically operated, can be stopped by open-
ing its inner gate at a distance of five or 
seven inches below the landing sill), cert, 
denied, 62 N.J. 82, 299 A.2d 80 (1972); 
Parise v. Otis Elevator Co., 100 Ohio App. 
200, 136 N.E.2d 113, 116-17 (1954) (some 
repairs to the elevator were made by the 
building owner's maintenance department, 
and the building owner's employees tam-
pered with and abused the elevator); Seay 
v. General Elevator Co., 522 P.2d 1022, 
1027 (Okla.1974) (defendant elevator repair 
company not in exclusive control of eleva-
tor where plaintiff was "acquainted with 
the door opening qualities of the elevator 
. . . . had been squeezed by them or other 
similar doors in that bank of elevators, 
knew that the doors could be held open by 
placing ;\ hand upon them, had seen this 
done during her frequent use of the eleva-
tors, and yet did not employ the means at 
hand to control the door prior and during 
her exit"); Brottz v. St. Judes Hosp. Clin-
ic, 184 W.Va. 594, 402 S.E.2d 263, 267-68 
(1991) (where three parties—the elevator 
owner, the elevator designer and installer, 
and the elevator maintenance company— 
each could be deemed to have some control 
over the elevator, and the plaintiff failed to 
establish that the latter, under its mainte-
nance contract, was probably responsible 
for the accident). 
We are aware of three states—Louisi-
ana, North Carolina, and Ohio—that view 
the exclusive control element in a more 
narrow fashion and, if presented with a 
case with facts identical to those sub judi-
ce, would likely conclude that the exclusive 
control element was not satisfied. See 
Brown v. Otis Elevator Co., 535 So.2d 525, 
527 (La.Ct.App. 1988); Hester v. Montgom-
ery Elevator Co., 392 So.2d 155, 156 (La. 
Ct.App.1980); Bryan v. Otis Elevator Co., 
2 N.C.App. 593, 163 S.E.2d 534, 536-37 
(1968); Norman v. Thomas Emery's Sons, 
Inc., 7 Ohio App.2d 41, 36 0.0.2d 95, 218 
N.E.2d 480, 482 (1966). 
We find the reasoning of the New York, 
Nevada, Florida and Pennsylvania courts to 
be most persuasive. Accordingly, we are 
satisfied that based on the evidence ad-
duced at trial, the jury could have reason-
ably concluded that Dover had exclusive 
control of elevator number two. 
| l']|vi(lcnce of complete control is not re-
quired. It may be established by evi-
dence sufficient to warrant an inference 
of its existence, and circumstantial evi-
dence may suffice. The plaintiff is not 
required in his proof to exclude remotely 
possible causes and reduce the question 
of control to a scientific certainty. 
Leidrnfrost v. Atlantic Masonry, Inc., 235 
Md. 244, 250, 201 A.2d 336 (1964). Al-
though the Agreement purported to place 
"possession or control" of the elevator with 
CW, we hold that the contract's language 
is not controlling. See Street, 327 So.2d at 
114 ("Res ipsa loquitur is applicable where, 
as here, the defendant manufactures, in-
stalls, and maintains an automatic passen-
ger elevator even though the mamtenance 
contract purports to place control or pos-
session in the building owner."). "The cru-
cial point is the actual control of the eleva-
tor system " Id. But see Bryan, 163 
S.E.2d at 537 (contractual provision con-
trols). 
Dover manufactured, installed, and was 
under a continuing contractual obligation 
to maintain and repair elevator number 
two. CW was obligated to prohibit others 
from making repairs or adjustments to the 
elevator. There was absolutely no evi-
dence indicating that Prudential, CW, or 
IBM attempted to repair the elevator. At 
most, CW's building engineer would turn 
the elevator off when IBM notified him of 
a mechanical failure. "In sum, [CW and 
Prudential] relied upon [Dover], as an ex-
pert in elevator maintenance, to locate and 
remedy any defects, and in such capacity, 
[the jury could have reasonably inferred 
that Dover] had exclusive control of the 
inspection and maintenance of [elevator 
number two]." See Weeden, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
at 904. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence sug-
gesting that the elevator was tampered 
with, altered in any way, or subjected to 
abuse. The elevator was used in an office 
building, presumably in its intended man-
ner. Cf. Harris, 92 Md.App. at 54, 606 
A.2d 305; Parise, 136 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
During a six week period preceding the 
incident, Dover was notified four times of 
misleveling problems with the elevator. 
Repairs were made to the elevator, and 
according to Moynihan, cleaning, rather 
than replacing, the 14 and 15 contacts 
caused the misleveling incident. "To re-
quire [Swann] to establish exclusive control 
in [Dover] with respect to any possible 
cause of the accident before permitting the 
application of res ipsa loquitur would 
emasculate the doctrine. He was re-
quired, as was done, only to produce suffi-
cient evidence from which it could be said 
that it was more likely than not that it was 
negligence on the part of [Dover]." See 
Briscoe, 572 P.2d at 537. The trial court 
should have left the question of exclusive 
control for the jury which could have rea-
sonably inferred from the evidence that 
only Dover's negligence caused the acci-
dent. 
(3) 
[18] We now turn to the last element of 
res ipsa loquitur: "under circumstances 
indicating that the casualty did not result 
from the act or omission of the plaintiff." 
Appellees maintain that Swann's negli-
gence contributed to the accident. We ad-
dressed this issue in Fields v. Morgan, 89 
Md.App. 82, 382 A.2d 1099 (1978). 
In Fields, the plaintiff brought suit 
against the driver of a car in which he was 
riding after he sustained personal injuries 
when the car crashed into a tree. 
During the trial [plaintiff], through the 
testimony of a police officer, introduced 
a statement made by [the driver] to the 
effect that after striking the pedestrian 
he wanted to stop but [plaintiff] insisted 
he continue. According to the statement 
the two men "drove off Powder Mill 
Road until they got to a government 
road and started fighting over the steer 
ing wheel; went into a spin and they 
struck a tree." The statement was con-
tradicted by [plaintiff] who testified that 
when [the driver] swerved and hit the 
pedestrian, he struck his head on the 
steering wheel and did not remember 
another thing until he woke up in the 
hospital some time later. 
Id. at 84, 382 A.2d 1099. At the close of 
plaintiff's case, the trial court ruled that 
res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable and 
granted the driver's motion for a directed 
verdict. We held that the doctrine was 
applicable and remanded the case for a new 
trial. 
There was direct evidence that [the driv-
er and appellant] were fighting over the 
steering wheel at the time of the accident 
but there was also direct evidence that 
[appellant] was unconscious and could 
not have engaged in a fight. Under 
these circumstances, the trial judge 
should not have granted the motion for • 
directed verdict as the resolution of the 
conflicting testimony was for the jury. 
Cite m* 620 A.2d 
Id. at 88, 382 A.2d 1099; see also Bams v. 
Fonte, 241 Md. 123, 215 A.2d 739 (1966); 
Powell v. Moore, 228 Or. 255, 364 P.2d 
1094, 1100 (1961) (en banc) ("And even 
where there is some evidence that plain-
tiff's failure to exercise care in the use of 
defendant's equipment was a contributing 
cause producing the injury, the doctrine is 
not excluded as a matter of law; rather the 
case is to be submitted to the jury with 
proper instructions permitting the jury to 
draw the inference of defendant's negli-
gence if it finds that plaintiff by his own 
conduct was not responsible for causing his 
injury.") 
In the case sub judice, Swann testified 
that he looked into the elevator before en-
tering, saw no exiting passengers, and en-
tered without realizing the elevator had 
misleveled. The elevator had misleveled by 
twelve to eighteen inches, placing the dis-
tance between the floor and the roof of the 
elevator at five feet, six inches to six feet. 
Swann's human factors expert testified 
that it was possible an individual would not 
notice that an elevator misleveled under 
these circumstances. 
The trial court sent the issue of Appel-
lees' negligence to the jury. The court also 
instructed the jury on contributory negli-
gence. Obviously, the court believed there 
was a factual dispute as to both Appellees' 
and Swann s negligence. Although we do 
not know, it may very well be that the jury 
found Swann was contributorily negligent. 
Nevertheless, the jury could have reason-
ably found Swann proved all three ele-
ments of res ipsa loquitur by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, and therefore, the 
trial court erred in not instructing the jury 
as requested. By refusing to give a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction, the trial court 
substituted its own judgment for that of 
the jury. A new trial is ordered, but only 
as to Dover. 
The dissent is concerned with two as-
pects of the majority opinion. First, the 
dissent points to the fact that Swann "mar-
shalled evidence to show the precise cause 
of the misleveling—the malfunction of the 
contacts—and to show as well that Dover 
was negligent in not replacing those con-
989 (Md.App. 1993) 
tacts prior to the accident." The dissent 
concludes that "[w|hen the plaintiff's case 
is so built around a specific, articulated 
cause of the event and endeavors to show 
that that cause arose solely because of 
specific negligence on the defendant's 
part," he should not be able to "avail him-
self of an inference that the event arose 
from some other cause, also engendered by 
the defendant's negligence" (emphasis in 
original). The dissent is concerned that 
this would allow a plaintiff to rely on res 
ipsa loquitur in every negligence case. 
1191 First, a plaintiff is entitled to a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction only when Hicks 
tripartite test is satisfied. Only a minority 
of negligence cases call for such an instruc-
tion. Therefore, in that respect, the dis-
sent's concern is unwarranted. 
Second, by introducing specific evidence 
that the failure to replace the contacts on 
January 7th caused the misleveling, Swann 
did not purport to furnish a complete expla-
nation of the accident. There were other 
unknowns. For example, Swann intro-
duced evidence that Dover responded to 
two separate reports of mislevelings subse-
quent to the January 7th repair. Not in 
evidence was what, if any, corrective mea-
sures Dover took on those occasions. The 
jury was free to accept or reject Swann's 
expert testimony regarding the January 
7th repair. If the jury believed that clean-
ing, rather than replacing, the contact was 
proper, or that the alleged defective con-
tact did not cause the misleveling, Swann 
should not, as a matter of policy, be pre-
cluded from relying on an inference of neg 
ligence. 
[201 The dissent's "second concern is 
with the notion that elevators don't mislev 
el absent someone's negligence." The dis 
sent suggests that "(mjechanical, electrical 
and electronic devices fail or malfunctior 
routinely [due to] [a] speck of dust, i 
change in temperature, misuse, [or] an acci 
dental unforeseen trauma." It may b< 
true that mechanical, electrical, and elec 
tronic devices fail due to non-negligen 
causes. The dissent, however, confuse! 
probabilism with absolutism. 
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The first element of Hicks requires only 
that the "casualty [was] of a sort which 
usually does not occur in the absence of 
negligence." Hicks, 25 Md.App. at 516, 
337 A.2d 744 (emphasis added). 
[T]he majority of cases hold that a plain-
tiff to come within the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine need not show such a state of 
facts surrounding the accident as ex-
cludes any reasonable hypothesis except 
defendant's negligence. If the attendant 
facts raise a reasonable inference of de-
fendant's negligence, they need not also 
exclude every other inference. Plaintiff 
under this view is not required to exclude 
or negative all other possible causes of 
the accident except that of defendant's 
negligence, but need only demonstrate a 
"balance of probabilities" pointing to the 
defendant's negligence as a cause of the 
accident. 
Speiser, supra, § 2:5, at 41-42 (footnotes 
omitted). Consequently, res ipsa loquitur 
has been applied to a wide variety of 
situations, and its range is as broad as 
the possible events which reasonably jus-
tify such a conclusion. It finds common 
application, for example, in the case of 
objects such as bricks or window panes 
falling from the defendant's premises, 
falling elevators, the collapse of struc-
tures, live stock loose on the highway, 
the escape of gas or water from mains, 
or of electricity from wires or appliances, 
the explosion of boilers or other objects 
under the defendant's control, or the es-
cape of dust or noxious gases from his 
premises, the sudden starting of machin-
ery, the detachment of wheels from mov-
ing vehicles, injuries to passengers from 
causes within the control of the carrier, 
such as derailment, the sudden stop of a 
bus, or its defective equipment, some 
kinds of automobile accidents, such as a 
car suddenly leaving the highway and 
going into a ditch or colliding with a 
stationary object, or starting down hill 
not long after it has been parked at the 
curb, defective food in sealed containers, 
and many other similar occurrences. 
W. Page Keaton et al., Prosser and Kea-
ton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 244-45 
(5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
In Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 
619 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1980), the Supreme Court 
of Colorado considered whether an elevator 
door closing on a passenger was the kind 
of event which ordinarily does not occur in 
the absence of negligence. The Court con-
cluded it was, relying, in great part, on the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which pro-
vides: 
"The plaintiff need not, however, conclu-
sively exclude all other possible explana-
tions and so prove his case beyond a 
reasonable doubt It is enough that 
the facts proved reasonably permit the 
conclusion that negligence is the more, 
probable explanation." 
Id. at 69 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, § 328D cmt. e (1964)); see also Kea-
ton, supra, § 39, at 248 ("The plaintiff is 
not required to eliminate with certainty all 
other possible causes or inferences, which 
would mean that the plaintiff must prove a 
civil case beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
For a misleveling case similar to the one 
sub judice, with expert testimony similar 
to that presented in the court below, see 
Daniels v. Standard Oil Realty Corp., 145 
IIl.App.3d 363, 99 IIl.Dec. 284, 288, 495 
N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (1986), cert, denied, 
where the Court held that "[i]n the normal 
course of events, an elevator does not oper-
ate as the elevator here did, and when it 
does, negligence is a more likely cause than 
other causes." 
In the case sub judice, the jury could 
have reasonably concluded that negligence 
was a more likely cause than other causes. 
This is all the first element of the Hicks 
test requires. The ultimate determination 
of negligence is for the jury. Therefore, 
since this is, at worst, a borderline case, the 
jury, and not the court, should decide. See 
Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, 146 Ariz. 98, 703 
P.2d 1247, 1250 (Ct.App.1985) (whether an 
elevator malfunction would ordinarily not 
occur absent someone's negligence is a jury 
question in borderline cases). 
(B) 
Missing Evidence 
[21] Swann argues that the trial court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury n-
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garding alleged missing evidence. Accord-
ing to Swann, Dover failed to produce all of 
the repair order tickets from the repair 
calls made between December 1986 and the 
date of the incident. He claims the failure 
to retain these documents was in direct 
conflict with Dover's document retention 
policy. 
Swann did not preserve the issue for our 
review. Thus, we do not reach the merits 
of his argument. Although Swann submit-
ted a proposed jury instruction regarding 
missing evidence, Swann did not object to 
the trial court's failure to give the instruc-
tion to the jury. "No party may assign as 
error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless the party objects on the 
record promptly after the court instructs 
the jury, stating distinctly the matter to 
which the party objects and the grounds of 
the objection." Rule 2-520(e); Barone v. 
Winebrenner, 189 Md. 142, 145, 55 A.2d 
505 (1947) ("The purpose, of course, in re-
quiring exceptions to be made to the in-
structions of the trial judge before the jury 
retires is to give that judge an opportunity 
to correct or add to his instructions matters 
either first erroneously stated or omit-
ted."). 
(C) 
Violation of a Statute as Evidence 
of Negligence 
[22] Swann argues the trial court erred 
by refusing to instruct the jury that the 
violation of a statute is evidence of negli-
gence. Swann cites Maryland Annotated 
Code article 83B, § 6-102 (1991), and as-
serts that it "authorizes the Maryland De-
partment of Housing and Community fsic] 
to develop and promulgate appropriate 
building codes to protect the public when it 
uses buildings in this State." Swann con-
tinues by pointing out that "the Depart-
ment adopted, and incorporated by refer-
ence, the ANSI A117.1 Building Code" 
which provides: 
Elevator operation shall be automatic. 
Each car shall be equipped with a self-
leveling feature that will automatically 
bring the car to floor landings within a 
tolerance of xk in (13 mm) under rated 
loading to zero loading conditions. Thi 
self-leveling feature shall be automati 
and independent of the operating devic 
and shall correct for overtravel or undei 
travel. 
American National Standard Institute, Inc 
American National Standard for Builo 
ings and Facilities—Providing Accessibii 
ity and Usability for Physically Hand\ 
capped People § 4.10.2 (1986) (hereinafte 
"ANSI A117.1"); see also COMAR 05.02 
02.02(H). Swann contends that since Mo> 
nihan testified that the above provision a^  
plies in Maryland, and since he is "withi 
the class of people governed [sic] by thes 
provisions," the court erred in failing t 
instruct the jury as requested. We di? 
agree. 
"It is well settled in Maryland that 
violation of a building code can be evidenc 
of breach of a duty owed." Gardenvillag 
Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md.App. 25, 3( 
366 A.2d 101 (1976). It is equally settlec 
however, that "[t|he violation of a [code 
may furnish evidence of negligence .. 
only where the person alleging negligenc 
is within the class of persons sought to b 
protected, and the harm suffered is of th 
kind which the [code] was intended, in ger 
eral, to prevent." Atlantic Mut. Ins. Ct 
v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 124, 591 A.2d 50 
(1991) (citation omitted). Further, the vi< 
lation of a code must be a proximate caus 
of the harm. Id. at 127, 591 A.2d 50' 
Article 83B, § 6-102(a)(1) of the Annota 
ed ('ode of Maryland provides: "The I)< 
partment . .. shall promulgate and adopt 
State building code for the purpose of di 
veloping rules and regulations for makin 
buildings and facilities accessible and u 
able by the physically handicapped 
(emphasis added). In response to § f 
102(a)(l)'s directive, the Department < 
Housing and Community Development pr 
mulgated the "Maryland Building Code f< 
the Handicapped." COMAR 05.02.02. Tl 
purpose of the code "is to establish mir 
mum requirements that will provide a re 
sonable degree of accessibility and usabi 
ty of buildings and facilities by the phyf 
cnlly handicapped" COMAR 05.02.0: 
02(A) (emphasis added). Specifically, 
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[t]he specifications . . . are intended to 
make buildings and facilities accessible 
to and usable by people with such physi-
cal disabilities as the inability to walk, 
difficulty walking, reliance on walking 
aids, blindness and visual impairment, 
deafness and hearing impairment, incoor-
dination, reaching and manipulation disa-
bilities, lack of stamina, difficulty inter-
preting and reacting to sensory informa-
tion, and extremes of physical size. Ac-
cessibility and usability allow a physi-
cally handicapped person to get to, en-
ter, and use a building or facility. 
ANSI A117.1, § 1.1 (emphasis added). 
It is crystal clear that COMAR 05.02.-
02.02 and ANSI A117.1 are not intended to 
protect "the public." Rather, the intent of 
these provisions is to make public buildings 
accessible and usable by physically handi-
capped persons. For example, § 4.10.2 al-
lows individuals confined to a wheelchair 
ready access to elevators by requiring the 
elevator to have a self-leveling feature that 
brings the elevator to within Vt inch of 
floor level. As Appellees point out, there 
was no evidence that Swann was physically 
disabled at the time of the accident. Ac-
cordingly, Swann may have incidentally 
benefited from the code provision, but he 
was not "within the class of persons 
sought to be protected." Kenney, 323 Md. 
at 124, 591 A.2d 507. 
(D) 
Non-Delegability of a Land Owner's Duty 
[231 Last, Swann argues that the trial 
court erred by refusing to instruct the jury 
that the duty a land owner owes to a busi-
ness invitee is non-delegable. Swann notes 
that CW and Prudential's defense focused 
on their lack of notice—that Dover did not 
notify them of any problems and that they 
relied upon the expertise of Dover for all 
decisions concerning the care and mainte-
nance of the elevator. According to 
Swann, Prudential, as a property owner, 
had a nondelegable duty to correct all un-
reasonable risks, or to warn invitees of 
them, if they knew or should have known 
of such risks. 
Appellees contend that the trial court's 
instructions fairly instructed the jury as to 
a land owner's duty. Therefore, it was not 
necessary for the trial court to give 
Swann's requested instructions. 
During the jury instruction phase of tri-
al, the court instructed the jury as follows: 
The plaintiff in this case, Mr. Swann, is 
what the contemplation of law [sic] is 
called the invitee. An invitee is a person 
who is on the property of another for the 
interest of the owner or occupier of the 
premises. 
The owner or occupier of premises has 
a duty to the invitee. The owner/occupi-
er must use ordinary care to see that 
those portions of the property which the 
invitee, in this case Mr. Swann reason-
ably may be expected to use are safe or 
if not safe to give the invitee reasonable 
notice of the unsafe condition. 
If the owner/occupier of the premises 
sets aside a portion of the property for 
the common use of his tenants owes [sic] 
the tenants a duty to exercise ordinary 
care to keep those portions of the premis-
es in a safe condition or if not safe to 
notify the tenants of the unsafe condi-
tion. 
Also further the landlord or occupier 
who has agreed to make repairs may be 
responsible for the injuries resulting 
from his failure to make such repairs. 
Swann claims the trial court improperly 
refused to read to the jury the following 
two proposed instructions: 
The duty of a land owner to a business 
invitee is a non-delegable duty. That is 
something of a misnomer, as the owner 
is free to delegate the duty of perfor-
mance to another, but the owner cannot 
thereby avoid or delay its liability for the 
non-performance of the delegated duties. 
Where an owner invites a business invi-
tee to come onto its premises, the duty of 
the owner to the invitee is not changed 
by the employment of an independent 
contractor. 
A land owner has a duty to keep its 
property in a safe condition which it 
holds open to the public. That duty can 
not be delegated. The land owner is 
Cite at 620 A.2d 989 (Md.App. 1993) 
responsible for the condition of the prop-
erty. The land owner is not responsible 
merely to supervise the independent con-
tractor that it has hired to maintain the 
property. Although the property owner 
may hire someone to perform mainte-
nance on the premises, the land owner 
cannot avoid or delegate the risk of non-
performance of the duty by the person so 
hired. 
We perceive no error. 
A party is generally entitled to have its 
theory of the case presented to the jury if: 
"(1) the instruction . . . correctly state[s] 
the law, and (2) that law [is] applicable in 
light of the evidence before the jury." 
Pickett, 285 Md. at 194, 401 A.2d 651. This 
notwithstanding, however, "[t]here is no 
obligation that the trial court point out any 
and all of the reciprocal duties and obli-
gations of the respective parties in minute 
detail, provided the subject is fully and 
comprehensively covered in the charge to 
the jury." Flohr v. Coleman, 245 Md. 254, 
266, 225 A.2d 868 (1967). 
We hold that the instructions given fairly 
and comprehensively instructed the jury as 
to the duty a land owner owes an invitee. 
Swann's requested instructions would have 
overemphasized Prudential and CW's duty, 
and would have been unduly suggestive 
and prejudicial. The trial court did not 
state that a land owner's duty was delega-
ble; therefore, the jury should not have 
been under the impression that the duty 
was delegable. 
JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF APPEI^ 
LEES PRUDENTIAL AND CAREY WIN-
STON AFFIRMED; JUDGMENT IN FA-
VOR OF APPELLEE DOVER RE-
VERSED; CASE REMANDED FOR FUR-
THER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT 
WITH THIS OPINION. 
COSTS TO BE PAID % BY APPEI/-
LANT AND Vb BY APPELLEE DOVER. 
WILNER, Chief Judge, concurring and 
dissenting. 
I concur in the affirmance of the judg-
ments in favor of Prudential and Carey 
Winston but dissent from the reversal of 
the judgment in favor of Dover. 
I have two concerns with the panel ma-
jority's conclusions regarding a res ipsa 
loquitur instruction. First, although I 
quite agree that, under current Maryland 
law, the mere offering of evidence of spe-
cific negligence does not, of itself, preclude 
a jury, upon a proper res ipsa loquitur 
instruction, from inferring negligent con-
duct, it seems to me that the plaintiff really 
did prove (or attempt to prove) too much 
for the doctrine to apply in this case. He 
marshalled evidence to show the precise 
cause of the misleveling—the malfunction 
of the contacts—and to show as well that 
Dover was negligent in not replacing those 
contacts prior to the accident. The focus 
of the case was on whether Dover was 
remiss in merely cleaning the contacts rath-
er than replacing them. 
When the plaintiff's case is so built 
around a specific, articulated cause of the 
event and endeavors to show that thai 
cause arose solely because of specific negli 
gence on the defendant's part, I do nol 
believe that the plaintiff, if he fails to per 
suade the jury that his position has merit 
can then avail himself of an inference thai 
the event arose from some other cause 
also engendered by the defendant's negli 
gence. If that were the case, a res ipsr 
loquitur instruction would be appropriate 
in every negligence case. If that is wha 
Mr. Speiser is selling (Maj. op. p. 1005), 
don't buy it. 
My second concern is with the notioi 
that elevators don't mislevel absent some 
one's negligence. This Court made a simi 
lar kind of bald statement, with respect t< 
escalators, in Beach v. Woodward & Loth 
rop, Inc., 18 Md.App. 645, at 649, 308 A.2 
439 (1973), offering no authority or rations 
explanation for the statement. Similar pre 
nouncements have been made by othc 
courts, as mentioned by the panel majority 
and so I obviously cannot complain that il 
conclusion in this regard is without an 
legal support. My problem is in unde 
standing the rationale for such a doctrin 
Mechanical, electrical, and electronic d 
vices fail or malfunction routinely—son 
more routinely than others. A speck < 
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dust, a change in temperature, misuse, an 
accidental unforeseen trauma—many 
things can cause these devices to malfunc-
tion. To allow an inference that the mal-
function is due to someone's negligence 
when the precise cause cannot be satisfac-
torily established appears to me to be un-
warranted. The cases cited by the panel 
majority say it is so, but they don't say 
why it is so—at least not convincingly. WELTS' CASE. 
yir,iji r» i.rtnR IN. n. 1017 
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duct, hut not punishment, every case is 
judged on its own facts and circumstances, 
No. LD-90-007. 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire. 
Feb. 12, 1993. 
In attorney discipline proceeding, the 
Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that: (1) 
even if representation of client in related 
matters is of highest quality, misrepresent-
ing to client that suit has been filed when 
in fact it has not violates Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct requiring lawyer to provide 
competent representation to client, to act 
with reasonable promptness and diligence 
in representing client, and prohibiting con-
duct involving misrepresentation, and (2) 
such misconduct warrants public censure. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Attorney and Client <3=>44(1) 
Even if representation of client in re-
lated matters is of highest quality, misrep-
resenting to client that suit has been filed 
when in fact it has not violates Rules of 
Professional Conduct requiring lawyer to 
provide competent representation to client, 
to act with reasonable promptness and dili-
gence in representing client, and prohibit-
ing conduct involving misrepresentation. 
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1(a), (b)(5), 
(c)(4) 1.3(a), 8.4(c). 
2. Attorney and Client e=*38 
Finding of misrepresentation alone 
constitutes "misconduct" for purposes of 
Rule of Professional Conduct prohibiting 
lawyers from engaging in conduct involv-
ing "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepre-
sentation"; rule is disjunctive. Rules of 
Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4(c). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Attorney and Client 0=58 
To accomplish desired ends of attorney 
discipline proceedings, including protection 
of public, maintenance of public confidence 
in bar, preservation of legal profession's 
integrity, and prevention of similar con-
4. Attorney and Client <s=s58 
Attorney misconduct in misrepresent 
ing to client that suit has been filed, when 
in fact it has not, mitigated by isolated 
nature of misconduct, attorney's candor 
and cooperation with Committee on Profes-
sional Conduct, voluntary disclosure of mis-
conduct in manner calculated to mitigate 
prejudice to client, lack of prior disciplinary 
record, lack of personal gain as motive, 
personal and emotional problems, and re-
morse warrants only public censure, not 
six-month suspension. Rules of Prof.Con-
duct, Rules 1.1(a). (b)(5), (c)(4), 1.3(a), 1.4(a), 
8.4(c). 
Carroll R. Hunter, PA., Meredith (Car-
roll R. Hunter on brief and orally and Peter 
J. Minkow on the brief), for committee on 
professional conduct. 
Aeschliman & Tober, P.A., Portsmouth 
(Stephen L. Tober on the brief and orally), 
for respondent. 
HORTON, Justice. 
This action is brought by the committee 
on professional conduct (the committee), 
which petitions this court to suspend the 
respondent, Jeremy Welts, from the prac-
tice of law in this State for a period of six 
months. On October 24, 1990, we appoint-
ed a Judicial Referee (Bean, J.) to conduct 
a hearing on the committee's petition. The 
referee found, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the respondent violated Rules 
1.1(a), 1.1(b)(5), 1.1(c)(4), 1.3(a), 1.4(a), and 
8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(the Rules). The respondent maintains that 
the evidence presented does not support 
the findings of ethical misconduct. Failing 
this argument, he contends that mitigating 
circumstances favor the imposition of a 
reprimand rather than a suspension. 
Early in 1987, Robert and Mary Dam 
bach consulted with the respondent's lav* 
firm regarding financial problems theii 
small corporation was having with its prin 
cipal lender, New Hampshire Business De 
velopment Corporation (NHBI)C). In Jul) 
TabC 
then you realized the door was closing? 
A It wasn't closing slow. 
Q But you realized the door was closing at 
that point in time? 
A Yeah. 
Q And then what did jyou do? 
A When it closed, the only thing I felt 
was my wrist slam against the thing. I just stuck 
my body in there to push and get my arm out, and 
that's when I started --
MR. NIELSEN: You pushed your body 
against the outside of the elevator? 
THE WITNESS: To push it open. 
MR. NIELSEN: You have to give him — 
describe that. 
THE WITNESS: See, right here. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) You're referring to 
Exhibit 1 again? 
A See, when this thing was closing. 
Q You mean the — 
A On my wrist, it slammed my wrist there 
in between. I had to stick my body in between there 
to push. I got my wrist out of there, okay, and 
then I said a lot of curse words, going crazy. 
Q Let me back up again. What I want to 
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1 know, when the door began to close or when you 
2 became aware that it was closing, you were still 
3 J outside, your body was still outside the elevator; 
4 J is that correct? 
5 I A Yeah, my body was outside. 
6 Q Were your arms reaching into the el --
7 I A Yes, they was. 
8 I Q How long was this mop you had in your 
9 I hands? 
10 A The same size as a mop. 
11 J Q Just a standard mop? 
12 A Yeah. 
13 Q Was it not as tall as you are? 
14 A I imagine, you know, the mop. 
15 MR. NIELSEN: Five feet, six feet, four 
16 feet? 
17 THE WITNESS: I can't really say. It 
18 wasn't a small mop. It was probably about the same 
19 J height as me. 
20 Q (By Mr. Fowler) Okay, roughly? 
21 A Yeah. 
22 Q And you were able to, by standing 
23 outside the elevator and reaching in with the mop 
24 handle in your arms, you were able to reach enough 
25 of the — 
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1 A Yeah. 
2 Q Could you have done the whole surface of 
3 the floor from there without stepping into the 
4 elevator? 
5 A Yeah, no problem. 
6 Q Okay, what position was your body in 
7 when the door began to close on you? 
8 A Straight. 
9 Q You were standing up straight? 
10 A Yeah. When I was going like this. 
11 That's when I went like that. That's when the door 
12 hit my wrist. 
13 J Q You're indicating that you were leaning 
14 forward? 
15 A Yeah, leaning forward. 
16 Q Did you have your arms extended forward 
17 ahead of you? 
18 A Yes. Sometimes I use one mop to, one 
19 J hand to mop. 
20 Q Were you using one hand at the time? 
21 A I think so. 
22 Q So you think the mop was in your left 
23 hand? 
24 A It was in my left hand. 
25 Q What was your right hand doing? 
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A My right hand? 
Q Yes. 
A Sometimes I mop like that, you know, 
Q I'm just asking you if you remember how 
your body was positioned. You indicated that --
A I was leaning forward. 
Q You were leaning forward, but at first 
you showed me both your arms extended out in front 
of you, and now you're saying the mop may have been 
in one hand, so I'm trying to clarify. 
A When people mop, they can mop two ways, 
with both hands on the mop or one hand on the mop. 
Q Right. And what were you doing is the 
question? 
A I was just mopping. 
Q With one hand or two hands? 
A First with both hands, and then I let 
this one go (indicating). 
MR. NIELSEN: The right one go? 
THE WITNESS: The right one go, and then 
I started mopping with my left. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) So your right hand was 
down with your left? 
A Yes. 
Q And your right hand was extended out 
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holding the mop trying to get the floor mopped? 
A I only got halfway until the incident 
happened. 
Q When the door closed, what specifically 
did you do with your body? Did you try to stand up 
straight? 
A When it caught me there, it slammed my 
wrist against that -- in between here. 
MR. NIELSEN: In between the door and 
the wall? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) What I'm asking you, 
did you try to stand up straight and pull your arm 
back before the door closed? 
A I wasn't really all way down like this. 
I was --
Q You were standing up, but slightly 
hunched forward? 
A Not that hunched. 
Q Just a little bit? 
A But — 
Q But you had your arm out? 
A Yeah. 
Q Did you try to pull your arm back before 
the door closed on it? 
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1 A No. 
2 Q Were you trying to hold the door open 
3 with your arm? 
4 A I was trying to see to get it open, but 
5 it just took my arm, slammed it against the thing, 
6 Q So are you saying that when you began to 
7 realize the door was closing, you pressed against it 
8 with your left arm to try to keep it open? 
9 MR. NIELSEN: Go ahead. 
10 THE WITNESS: I'm saying when I was 
11 mopping, okay, the door slammed my hand against the 
12 wall. 
13 Q (By Mr. Fowler) You've said that, I'm 
14 asking you what happened before it, you hit the 
15 wall, did you try to pull your arm back or press it 
16 against the door? 
17 A I took my body to press it open. 
18 Q That didn't happen before the -- let me 
19 finish my question — before the door made contact 
20 with the wall? 
21 A I didn't push my arm. 
22 MR. NIELSEN: Let me ask him a 
23 question. When you realized the door was closing, 
24 did you try to hold the door to keep it from closing 
25 with your left arm? 
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THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
MR. NIELSEN: Tell him about that. 
You're having a hard time answering the question. 
You tried to hold the door open? 
THE WITNESS: I tried to hold the door 
from closing my arm. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) Tell me what exactly 
you did with your arm? 
A What any person would do. 
Q Which is what? 
MR. NIELSEN: Tell him how you did it. 
THE WITNESS: Just went like this 
(indicating). 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) You're indicating with 
your right arm, but you actually were using your 
left arm at the time? 
A No, my right arm. 
MR. NIELSEN: He's not talking about 
trying to pull out after the door was closed. He's 
talking about before it was closed. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) Take a minute and 
collect your thoughts. I want you to have a moment 
and think about that so you can give me your best 
recollection. 
A I know when I stuck my arm out for it to 
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close on my wrist, okay, it did not, you know, go 
open necessarily. 
Q The door didn't open when you touched 
it? 
A Yeah, it just kept on going, 
Q Which arm were you using to try to keep 
the door from closing? 
A This one right here (indicating), 
Q Your right arm, and were you pushing on 
the sides of the door with the palm of your hand? 
A No, this is the one that I had the mop 
in. 
Q Right, you had the mop in your left 
hand, so as you realized the door was closing, you 
reached with your right hand? 
A Yeah. 
Q And with the palm of your hands pressed 
against the edge of the door; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q What part of the door did you press your 
palm of your hand against? 
A What part of the door? 
Q Right. 
MR. NIELSEN: How high up on the door? 
THE WITNESS: I can't --
130 
SUSAN K. HELLBERG, R.P.R. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
MR. NIELSEN: Go ahead and demonstrate 
so he can see physically how it happened. 
THE WITNESS: It was like right here 
(indicating). 
MR. NIELSEN: The record will reflect 
that the witness is holding his right-hand against 
an imaginary closing door which is a chalkboard, I 
guess, or an easel of some sort on the wall, and 
it's being held at about his breast level, the shirt 
pocket level. Is that fair, counsel? 
MR. FOWLER: That's fine. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) Is it your memory that 
you stood up or stood any more erect before you 
reached out and put your palm of your hand on the 
door, or did you remain essentially in the same 
position while you did that? 
A Shoot, when something like that hits 
you, I was up. 
Q Okay. 
A So you know even if I pushed from here 
to here (indicating), I would have enough strength 
to get my body into there. 
MR. NIELSEN: To get your body into the 
position of pushing against the door? 
THE WITNESS: See, if I was down like 
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this, it would be hard. I would have had my arm 
ripped off. 
MR. NIELSEN: Do you remember your 
posture when you pushed against the door? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I was up. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) Again, I know we are 
going over this several times, so the details get 
clearer each time we do it. As the door began to 
close or you became aware that it was closing, you 
stood up and reached forward with your right hand 
and pressed against it in thinking that it would --
A It would pop open, but it didn't, it 
kept on going, so that's when I stuck my body in 
between the wall and --
Q Now, what I'm asking you, you indicated 
that the height at which you think you've placed 
your hands against the sides of the door that was 
closing, I want to ask you too whether there's a 
single door that closes or two doors or were you 
aware of, anything of that nature? Are we talking 
about a single door or double door? 
A The door goes like this, one way. 
Q Okay, I realize it's one door that 
closes, but are there two doors that open and go 
together were over here and over here, and when it 
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<~ T if- r~ . 
A I'm not sure what I mean to say. On 
some elevators, there's a door. I can't really say, 
it looked like just a single door, you know, because 
there's an elevator right here, and an elevator 
right there. The way it closed, it closed -- this 
one closed this way, and other one closed this way, 
and the one that I got hurt from my left, it closed 
to my right. 
Q Okay, what I'm asking is was there a 
door inside the other door, and I'm talking about 
the one service freight elevator where you were 
hurt, on some elevators, there's a door that will 
open to the hallway? 
A See, I can't really say. I'm not, you 
know. 
Q You didn't observe that one way or the 
other? 
A No. 
Q Do you know whether you placed your 
right hand on the side door? Did you have your 
hands all the way around it, so that your fingers 
were on the inside? 
A My hand was like this (indicating). 
Q You sort of had a grasp around the 
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1 inside of the door? 
2 A Yes. 
3 MR. NIELSEN: The witness indicates when 
4 your hand was like this, your fingers are extended 
5 and your thumb is on the outside surface of this 
6 J assembly of doors, and the edge of your ring finger 
7 1 is on the other edge? 
8 THE WITNESS: It was just around it like 
9 J you could. 
10 MR. NIELSEN: Your hand was trying to 
11 J surround the door assembly? 
12 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
13 Q (By Mr. Fowler) Did you observe on the 
14 door a flexible plastic or rubber edge that you 
15 could impact that would cause the door to open up 
16 again? 
17 MR. NIELSEN: A little rubber leading 
18 edge? 
19 THE WITNESS: I think so. 
20 Q (By Mr. Fowler) Did you make contact 
21 with that when you tried to — 
22 A Well, I had my arm around it. 
23 Q Your hand was around that as well as the 
24 door? 
25 A I can't tell you that it was. There's 
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two doors because I'm not the one that makes the 
elevators. 
Q Maybe there was only one. I'm asking if 
you saw one way or another? 
MR- NIELSEN: On all elevators, there's 
an inside door and an outside door. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) My question is, do you 
recall that your action of putting your hand against 
the inside of the door caused that runner or plastic 
leading edge to be depressed against the door? 
MR. NIELSEN: Do you remember whether 
your hand made contact with that? 
THE WITNESS: It made contact with it, 
but, see, the problem is if it made contact, then 
why did the door deep on going. 
Q (By Mr. Fowler) When you say it made 
contact with it, are you talking the door or that 
pressure edge? 
A I,m saying when the door was closing. 
Q Right. 
A You know, it's like, you know, when you 
got your hands around that, doesn't it push in? 
Q And your memory is that you put your 
hands around it and pushed it in? 
A Yeah. 
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